After his repeated failures in
Samarqand, Babur was attracted towards Hindustan. Taking advantage of the
political conditions in India, which was “a congeries of States” and “parceled
out among numerous mutually warring States”, Babur attacked it five times
during 1519 A.D. to 1525 A.D. Thus state Edwards and Garrett, “As had happened
more than once in past history, the internal dissensions of the country made it
an easy prey to a determined invader.”
In November 1525 A.D, Babur
set out from Kabul for his Indian conquest. After his conquest of Punjab,
defeating its governor Daulat Khan Lodhi, the Mughal invader advanced towards
Delhi. He writes, “As it was always in my heart to possess Hindustan, and as
these several countries had once been held by the Turks, I pictured them as my
own and was resolved to get them into my own hands, whether peacefully or by
force.” Babur’s ambitions clashed with those of Sultan Ibraham Lodhi of Delhi.
Although it was a difficult task to perform, as he had to take a battle against
the central power of the country, yet he was not discouraged: “Having placed my
foot on the stirrup of resolution and my hands on the reins of confidence in
God, I marched against Sultan Ibraham…..”
The Mughal forces reached the
town of Panipat on 29th Jamadi, 932 Hijri (April 12, 1528 A.D.).
Probably the same time, the Sultan had also reached there along with his
troops. For about a week, both the armies stood facing each other, but neither
took the offensive.
There is a controversy
regarding the numerical strength of the Mughals. While Babur in his Memoirs accepts it 12 thousand,
Rushbrooke Williams gives the number 8 thousand. However, the most accepted
view is that the Mughal troops were numbered not less than 25 thousand against
one lakh Afghans with 1,000 horsemen, at a ratio of 4:1. Ferishta is of the
opinion that the Afghan horsemen numbered 100 and not one thousand.
Babur in his Memoirs accepts that before the battle,
his army had lost its courage: “Many of the troops were in great tremor and
alarms. Trepidation and fear are always unbecoming; whatever the Almighty has
decreed from eternity cannot be reversed. At the same time I cannot blame them;
they had some reason of anxiety, for in two or three months they had travelled
from their native land and were now to engage in arms a nation of whom they
knew nothing.”
Before the start of the
battle, there was a week’s gap. Babur utilized the time efficiently and his
major success in this period lies in making his men courageous to fight. He
took a defensive line-up, drawing up his army in a long line. On his right,
stood the town and the suburbs of Panipat. From the left, he defended himself
by ditches, the felled trees and thorny shrubs. The centre was defended by 700
carts, connected by twisted bull-hides; between every pair of guns were five to
seven movable breast-works (tura) for
the protection of the matchlock men. At fixed intervals, open space was left
for 100 to 200 horsemen to charge abreast. In the Centre (ghul) stood Babur in person. His major commanders were Humayun and
Khwaja Khan on the Right; Mohammad Sultan Mirza and Mahdi Khwaja on the Left;
Chin Timur Sultan in the Right-Centre (ung-ghul);
and the Prime Minister Mir Ali Khalifa in the Left-Centre (sul-ghul). The Tulughama party
was under the Mongol chiefs and was standing on the extreme right and left.
Their duty was to take the enemy in rear. At a little distance behind the line
was the Reserve of picked horsemen under Abdul Aziz.
On the other end, Ibraham
Lodhi had also taken the field and divided his army into four divisions:
Centre, Right Wing, Left Wing and Advance Guard. The fighting experience and
the resources of the Afghan army was not contemporary, but much of the ancient
times. Moreover, Ibraham Lodhi made a great blunder as he did not utilize even
a minute of that one week period in completing and reviewing his military
preparations. Keene has nicely distinguished the two armies – “On one side were
the courage of despair and something of the resources of scientific warfare; on
the other side, men-at-arms of the medieval type with crowded ranks of supermen
and archers thronging on in foolhardy disorder.”
On Thursday, 7th
Rajab, 932 Hijri (i.e. April 19, 1526 A.D.), the Sultan celebrated a Jashan (merry making) and distributed
immense wealth among his men. In the meantime, Babur had militarily prepared
himself and wanted Ibraham to take offensive, who seemed to be in no such mood.
Next night i.e. on 20th
April, Babur ordered his four or five thousand soldiers to make a night attack
upon the Afghans. Although the attack failed, yet it fulfilled Babur’s
objectives. Next day (21st April), the Afghans rushed towards the
Mughal camp. They moved so breezily covering the four mile distance in a bit
three hours. However, they fell in confusion when found the front line defense
of Babur, and immediately checked their speed. In due course, the formation of
the Afghan army was badly broken and was crowded in the Centre. This was what
Babur exactly wanted. He then directed his Tulughamas to take the enemy in
flank and rear. The Left Wing of the Mughals was marching unconsciously and was
surrounded by the Afghans.
Babur, a great military
general, was very keenly observing his men’s movements and found his Left Wing
in great difficulty. He immediately directed his Centre to support the Left. In
due course, the Right also had to experience some hard moments and the
Right-Centre was sent to its assistance. Then Babur ordered Ustad Ali, the
master gunner, to do the magic, who was well supported by the cannoneer,
Mustafa, on the Left-Centre. The Afghans, at this stage, were surrounded on all
sides, facing arrows on either flank and the rear and fire-shots from the
front. They found themselves helpless against the Mughals and were crowded in
the centre.
All the friends and the
companions of the Sultan had fallen around him. Mahmud Khan, one of his
companions, advised him to run away and save his life. However, the Sultan
considered it disgraceful to run away from the field of his ‘death’ where
thousands of his loyals had sacrificed their lives for him. He wanted to die
not the death of cowardice but of a soldier, a true soldier and a true king. He
marched to the Front with his 4,000 loyal soldiers and fought like a brave
warrior, but was ultimately killed. The Afghans took to flight. The Mughals
sued them and massacred many of them.
Babur, having won this
historic battle, rushed to Delhi and sent Prince Humayun to take control of
Agra and its treasures. Thus observes Babur: “The sun had mounted spear-high
when the onset began, and the battle lasted till mid-day, when the enemy were
completely broken and routed and my people victorious and triumphant. By the
grace and mercy of Almighty God this difficult affair was made easy to me.”
About 50,000 Afghans are supposed to have been killed in the battle.
The first battle of Panipat
was thus a decisive battle which decided the Fate of India. With this battle,
the rule of the Afghan Sultanate came to an end and the Mughals made their way
for the establishment of their empire in India. S. Lanepoole has very
accurately pointed out, “To the Afghans of Delhi, the battle of Panipat was
their Cannae. It was the ruin of their dominion, the end of their power.”
Causes of Babur’s success:
A variety of factors can be
enumerated for Babur’s success against the Afghans at Panipat. Babur was a
great and an experienced military general. There is no exaggeration in the
observation that he was brought up in the battle-fields. He had adopted a
number of war-tactics during his constant wars in Central Asia. The utilization
of Tulughama was taken to task after he came across Shaibani Khan in the battle
of Sar-i-Pul in 1501 A.D. He knew very well how, when and where to strike.
Another vital example of his brilliant leadership can be seen in his
organization of the army and making proper arrangements for the support to that
division he found in difficulty. S.M. Jaffar comments, “Babur was a scientific
general, skillful in planning and thorough in execution.” Lanepoole completes
this observation, “Babur’s generalship had much to do with the successful
issue.” On the other hand, Babur himself believed of his rival that he was “an
inexperienced youngman, careless in his movements, who marched without order,
halted or retired without method and engaged without foresight.”
The numerical strength of the
Afghans was much more than that of the Mughals. However, number does not matter
unless it is well-experienced and well equipped in arms etc. The Afghans, though
more than a lakh in numbers, were not as experienced as the Mughals were. They
stood in the midst of the battle-field as if standing in a fair.
On the other hand, Babur
adopted such war-tactics that the enemy was found in a gear. The masterly utilization
of a week’s gap before the battle and the Tulughama
war-tactics made it easy for Babur to achieve success.
Babur had appeared at Panipat
with his artillery which was new to the Afghans. They had neither seen nor
heard of it. They possessed arrows which were of ancient times. Lanepoole
writes, “Arrows cannot answer the bullets and the work was done within few
hours.” Dr. Radhey Shyam has also considered this battle as “an unequal contest
between fire and man.” Indeed it was Babur’s artillery which played an
important role in his victory. According to Rushbrooke Williams, “If there was
one single material factor which more than any other conduced to his ultimate
triumph in Hindustan, it was his powerful artillery.”
Thus owing to his brilliant
leadership, excellent war-tactics, usage of artillery and well organized army –
Babur was able to win the battle of Panipat. It was a landmark in the history
of India. Dr. Radhey Shyam has given his opinion on the battle in these words: “Babur’s
wide experience of warfare and close observation of battles, which he himself
had fought against his adversaries or he had heard from others about the way in
which his ancestors used to fight,” gave him his victory in the field of
Panipat. The battle “testified Babur’s superior generalship, military
technique, superb skill and ability to combine effectively the artillery with
cavalry…. There is no doubt that the first battle of Panipat was one of the
greatest battles ever fought on the soil of Hindustan.”
