Nur Jahan and her reactions in the administration

Mehrun-nisa was married to Mughal Emperor, Jahangir in 1611 A.D, about four years after the death of her former husband, Sher Afghan. The Emperor was so much captivated by her charms that he conferred upon her the title of Nur Mahal and soon after that of Nur Jahan. As soon as Nur Jahan became Empress, she acquired an extra-ordinary influence upon the Emperor. Her influence increased day by day and with the passage of time, Jahangir became a mere tool in her hands and she became the paramount power in the State; she virtually began to exercise the power of sovereignty. Therefore, the period from 1611 A.D. to 1627 A.D. is considered as the reign of Nur Jahan rather than of Jahangir.

In the first instance, Nur Jahan installed her relatives to high offices of the State. Her father, Ghias Beg, who was a Mansabdar of 2,000 Zat and 500 Sawar in 1611 A.D, was raised to the rank of 7,000 Zat and 7,000 Sawar in 1619 A.D. He was given the title of Itmad-ud-Daula and raised to the high place and position of the Prime Minister. Her brother, Asaf Khan, who held the Mansab of 500 Zat and 100 Sawar upto 1611 A.D, was also promoted to the rank of 6000 Zat and 6000 Sawar in 1622 A.D, and was also appointed as the Finance Minister. He was a person of good intellect in politics and administration, and as Dr. Beni Prasad states, “As a financier, he stood unsurpassed in the Mughal empire.” Khurram, who was the favourite of Nur Jahan in early stages, was also patronized by her. His Mansab was raised to 30,000 Zat and 20,000 Sawar in honour of his victory in the Deccan. The title of Shah Jahan was also bestowed upon him.

She got her share with the Emperor in exercising her power and prerogatives of sovereignty. She got her name struck upon the coins. Of all the Farmans having the Royal Seal and signature, the Queen Begum (Nur Jahan) was jointly attached. She often appeared in the Jharokha along with the Emperor and listened to the complaints of her subjects. According to the author of Intikhab-i-Jahangiri, “Nothing was wanting to make her an absolute manner but the reading of Khutba in her name.”

Nur Jahan exercised full control on administration. All high appointments, promotions, transfers, postings and dismissals were done with consent. She took keen interest in the working of every department of administration and sent orders to ministers and officials, who were the highest nobles and dignitaries of the State, presented themselves before her and listened to her dictates. A word from her could make or marr the career of any one of them. Nur Jahan decided the question of war and peace, and also wielded judicial powers and could pardon or punish anyone. She was to V.A. Smith, “a power behind the throne.”

It was entirely the privilege of Nur Jahan to make grants of land to women. She could grant jagirs and also withdraw such grants. In this capacity, she helped many poor orphans and widows. Her influence was decisive to men. She easily persuaded the Emperor to grant or withhold the grant of jagir of a particular noble or officer. 

Jahangir was so much under the influence of his queen that he was virtually a tool in her hands. He himself wrote so, “I have bestowed sovereignty on Nur Jahan who is wise enough to conduct the affairs of the State. I require nothing beyond a bottle of wine and a piece of meat to keep myself merry.” Dr. Smith remarks, “Nur Jahan was a real power behind the throne. She kept Jahangir under her influence and herself employed all royal powers in State affairs. High placed officials and amirs of the State were always vigilant to carry t her orders because she could make or marr them according to her sweet will.”

In 1612 A.D, Nur Jahan’s niece, Arjunamand Banu Begum, was married to Prince Khurram. Speaking of the political importance of this marriage, Dr. Beni Prasad observes, “It symbolized the alliance of Nur Jahan, Itmad-ud-Daula and Asaf Khan with the heir apparent. For next ten years, this clique of four supremely capable persons practically ruled the Empire. What had been called Nur Jahan’s sway is really the sway of these four personages.”

The period of Nur Jahan’s influence is usually considered in two divisions. The first was from 1611 A.D. to 1622 A.D, when her parents were still alive and exercised a wholesome restraint upon her ambitions, when Jahangir himself was more or less an invalid and full event was given to strife and faction. In the first period, Khurram and Nur Jahan were in alliance, while in the second period they were antagonized to each other. The marriage of Shah Jahan with Nur Jahan’s daughter from Sher Afghan – Ladli Begum – in 1620 A.D, introduced a fresh complication. Under these circumstances, the division of the court into parties was inevitable. At first, they were only two – the Junta and its opponents. Later on, when the Junta itself broke up, there were much more. Mahabat Khan throughout the period played an important part and stood forth as the champion of the older nobility and at one time went to the extent of advising the Emperor against the party in power. The author of the Intikhab-i-Jahangir Shahi says, “The whole world is surprised that such a wise and sensible emperor as Jahangir should permit a man to have so great an influence over him.”  He also added that in his opinion it was “now very advisable to liberate Prince Khusrav from prison. Mahabat Khan championed the cause of popular and pathetic party struggle that was brewing at the court. But his bold counsel appears to have taken his good party by the Emperor, though its effect was ephemeral.” The Emperor acted in some measure upon the advice of Mahabat till he arrived in Kashmir, that if Malik Mahabat had advised him simultaneously to the same effect, this war would have made no permanent impression upon him.”

Nur Jahan took up the whole power of the government into her own hands. She made particular endeavours to make Jahangir give up his vices, and this cast upon him her good moral effect, but her influence in the political sphere was quite averse because she began to abuse her power. In order to increase and maintain her influence and position, she married her daughter, Ladli Begum, with Jahangir’s son, Shahriyar. She began to put in her strong efforts to make Shahriyar the successor of Jahangir, rather than Prince Khurram.

She added to Jahangir’s difficulties all the more. She injected poison in the body politics of the royal court simply for the sake of the achievement of success in her political ends. She turned hostile to herself by appointing her father, brother and relatives to high posts. As a result of these tactics, revolts began to take place in the country and several parts of the Mughal Empire began to become independent. This caused to Jahangir great anxiety and it became rather difficult for him to pass his last days peacefully.

The first consequence of Nur Jahan’s policy of favouritism was that the Mughals lost their control over Kandahar. In 1622 A.D, Shah Abbas, the ruler of Iran, took advantage of the political condition in India and occupied Kandahar. Nur Jahan, with a view to get rid of Prince Khurram, ordered him to recapture Kandahar. But the Prince, who well understood the tactics of Nur Jahan, refused to comply with the orders of the Queen and consequently Kandahar was lost by the Mughals.

The second consequence of Nur Jahan’s policy was that Prince Khurram revolted against his father in 1623 A.D. Nur Jahan was bent upon getting the throne for her son-in-law, Prince Shahriyar, after the death of Jahangir. Thus when Khurram refused to go to Kabul under her orders, she exalted Jahangir against him to a good deal. Royal orders were, therefore, issued for Prince Khurram to present at the Royal Court. Khurram was, at that time, the Governor of Deccan. When he received these orders, he at once made out that some kind of foul game was going to be played on him. He, therefore, revolted and marched from the Deccan towards Agra to take possession of the Royal treasury. But Prince Parvez and the famous general, Mahabat Khan, defeated him at Balochpur. He had to return to Deccan, and once again made preparations and advanced towards the East. He occupied Bengal and Bihar, but Mahabat Khan inflicted a severe defeat on him. Now being tired of the war, he surrendered himself in 1625 A.D. and sent his two sons – Dara and Aurangzeb – to the royal court. Jahangir pardoned him, but Shah Jahan continued to stay in the Deccan till 1627 A.D. i.e. the death of Jahangir.

Mahabat Khan was a famous and great general of Jahangir. Nur Jahan wanted to reduce his growing influence in the royal court in every possible way. She, therefore, got orders issued to Mahabat Khan by the Mughal emperor that he should appear in the royal court. Mahabat had already expected some kind of harassment in store for him. Consequently, he revolted in 1626 A.D. According to Dr. Ishwari Prasad, “Fully prepared for any contingency, Mahabat collected four or five thousand Rajputs and started for court.”

When Jahangir and Nur Jahan were going to Kabul, Mahabat Khan besieged the imperial camp on the banks of Jhelum and made Jahangir a captive, but Nur Jahan managed to escape.

As the Mughals found themselves in no match to the Rajputs, Nur Jahan acted very cleverly. She surrendered to Mahabat Khan and was allowed to join her husband n captivity. But she managed to cause mutual differences among the soldiers of Mahabat and freed herself. When Mahabat found himself in a tight corner, he rushed towards Lahore. Later on, he proceeded towards Thatta in Sind, where it was heard that Shah Jahan had laid a siege and had, thus, created a new problem for the emperor.

Jahangir died on October 28, 1627 A.D. Nur Jahan proclaimed Shahriyar the new emperor at Lahore. But Shah Jahan with the help of Asaf Khan, invaded Lahore and took Shahriyar a prisoner. Thus he himself became the Mughal emperor and Nur Jahan found it in her favour to submit.

Nur Jahan forms as the pivot on which the history of the rest of the reign turns. The rebellions of Shah Jahan and Mahabat Khan were primarily the reactions against the activities of Nur Jahan. To quote Dr. Beni Prasad, “No figure in the medieval history has been shrouded in such romance as the name of Nur Jahan calls to the mind. No incident in the reign of Jahangir has attracted such attention as his marriage with Nur Jahan. For full fifteen years that celebrated lady stood forth as the most striking and most powerful personality in the Mughal Empire. ”

Post Panipat problems of Babur

According to S. Lanepoole, “Babur was now (after Panipat) king of Delhi, but not yet king of Hindustan, much less of India.” Babur’s victory at Panipat had not given him the throne of India, but it had opened the gates of Hind for him. Speaking aptly, he was faced by a number of problems since Panipat. If he was successful in solving three problems, he was surely to be the ruler of India; or he would have lost here everything had he failed in tackling these problems. The problems are as follows:

(A)   Climate:

The first problem faced by Babur was the climatic conditions prevailing in Punjab and he had to adjust himself with these conditions. The scorching heat had trembled the Mughal soldiers in the months following the battle, because it is too hot during April to July in the Punjab. The Mughals wanted cool air as they had been in Kabul. Therefore they prepared themselves to leave India and return to Afghanistan. Even Babur admits, “The heats chanced to be unusually oppressive, and many men dropped at about the same time, as though struck by the samum, and died on the spot.” These climatic deaths also enforced them to leave India.

But Babur was very wise in dealing with this problem. He tried to prevent his soldiers from leaving India: “A mighty enemy has been overcome, and a rich and powerful kingdom is at your feet. And now having attained our goal and won our game, are we to turn back from all we have accomplished and fly to Kabul like men who have lost and discomfited? Let no man who calls himself my friend ever again moot such a thing. But if there is any of you who cannot bring himself to stay, then let him go.” This speech had a magical influence upon his soldiers and they left the idea of returning to Kabul.

(B)   Hostility of the natives:

For every ruler who has to face the hostility of his subjects, is his greatest problem. In case of Babur, although he had established his rule over Delhi and Agra, he was not supported by the natives. To them, he was a stranger, a dacoit. There was a heavy till of life in the battle of Panipat. More than 50,000 Indians had died in this battle. Therefore, the Indians could never forgive the Mughals and considered them as murderers. They were never prepared to subsidize the Mughals. Babur also writes, “When I came to Agra, it was the hot season. All the inhabitants fled from terror, so that we could find neither grain for ourselves nor fodder for our beasts. The villages, out of mere hatred and spite to us, had taken to anarchy, thieving and marauding. The roads became impassable.”

The natives in India were always seeking an opportunity when they could take revenge against the Mughals. Unfortunately, Babur till his end could not win their favour, although he adopted many measures to console their hearts.

(C)   Consolidation of the newly founded empire:

After the victory at Panipat, the Mughals were opposed by the Rajputs and the Afghans. People here were also against the establishment of the Mughal rule. It was important at this stage to consolidate the newly founded empire by means of reforms etc. However, Babur’s early death left the Mughal power in India in a precarious position. He had no time to consolidate his conquests or to establish any permanent machinery of government. What he had won, he had won by the sword, and it is not until the reign of his grandson, Akbar, that active and orderly administration can be said to have existed. Though Babur could not find enough time, and remained busy with his military transactions in India, he got the measurement of land, established the dak-chaukis, which were some of his steps taken with regard to his consolidation work of his empire.

(D)   The Rajputs:

The Rajputs were the foremost trouble to the Mughals. Babur’s decision to stay in India and to establish the Mughal rule here, clashed with the interests of Rana Sangram Singh of Mewar (better known as Rana Sanga in history), who according to S.M. Jaffar, “was at that time the most powerful prince and his was the premier state…. As a prince of great wisdom, valour and virtue, he occupied a high position among the Rajput princes of India.” Rana Sanga was ambitious to re-establish the Hindu rule in the North India. So Babur wanted to put an end to this problem.

But it was not an easy task for Babur, as his own men were afraid of the Rajputs, the stories of whose bravery and courage they had heard. The Rajputs had repeatedly over-run the Mughal troops in the pre-Kanwaha skirmishes. A prophecy, by an astrologer from Kabul, of the Mughal defeat at the hands of the Rajputs had also terrified the Mughals.

It was an anxious moment for Babur. He renounced wine, poured his store of liquor on the ground and broke his precious vessels before an assemblage of his officers and troops. Tamgha was abolished for all the Muslims in his dominion. But even then the morale of his dispirited men was not raised. Then he addressed them in these words: “Noblemen and soldiers! Every man that comes into the world is subject to dissolution. When we are passed away and gone, God only survives unchangeable. Whoever comes to the feast of life, must, before it is over, drink from the cup of death. He, who arrives at the inn of mortality, must one day inevitably take his departure from that house of sorrow – the world. – How much better is it to die with honour than to live with infamy? – God Most High has been gracious in giving us this destiny that if we fall we die martyrs, if we conquer we triumph in His Holy Cause.” Also, “What will all the Mohammedan kings of the world say of a monarch whom the fear of death obliged to abandon such a kingdom?”

These words inspirited the Mughal troops and filled their hearts with confidence. They swore by the divorce of their wives and on the Holy Quran, declaring to stand by their king in weal and woe.

On March 16, 1527 A.D, the two armies met at Khanua. Babur adopted the araba war-strategy. He took his place in the Centre. On the Right were Chin Timur and Khusrav Kukiltash. Humayun, Dilawar Khan Khanan and other Indian nobles were also on the right wing. The Left was commanded by Syed Mahdi Khwaja. On the extreme right and left were the flanking parties, while the artillery line was commanded by Nizam-ud-Din Ali Khalifa.

The war was opened by Rana’s left wing by attacking the right of the Mughals. But Chin Timur drove them back. The Turkish gunner, Mustafa Rumi, forwarded the carts and guns from the Centre of Humayun’s division and broke the enemy’s ranks. The attack by Rana’s right also failed. Then Babur directed his Centre to come forth and within ten hours the Mughals were victorious. Rana Sanga was wounded and took to flight. Hasan Khan Mewati, allied with the Rajputs, was killed while Sultan Mahmud Lodhi escaped from the battle-field.

Though Babur had won a great victory over the Rajputs, the problem was not yet over. A Rajput chief, Medini Rai, had established himself in Chanderi on the border of Bundelkhand and Malwa. The Mughals besieged the fort on January 27, 1528. The Rajputs resisted the enemy, but as Sir E.D. Ross writes, “The garrison on the second day gave up all hope of resistance, and having put their women to death they rushed out raked to perish, but not to be captured.”

In these two battles, the Rajputs were killed in thousands and it is even said that there was no single Rajput house which had not to mourn the death of at least a single member. It crippled the power of the Rajputs completely.

(E)    The Afghans:

Although the Afghans had been defeated at Panipat, they were likely to raise problems for Babur, so that he left India for the Afghans. Many Afghan nobles – Alam Khan Lodhi, Hasan Khan Mewati, Nasir Khan Lohani, Maruf Farmuli and many others had been united to drive the Mughals out of India. Darya Khan’s son, Bahar Khan, was elected as the chief of all the Afghan nobles and he adopted the title of Sultan Mahmud. The other Afghan nobles – Biban, Bayazid and Azam Khan, along with Sultan Ibraham Lodhi’s brother, Mahmud Lodhi, were invited to join them in Bihar.

Towards the end of January 1528 A.D, the Afghan rebels advanced from Bihar to Doab. On February 2, Babur started for the east to meet the Afghan aggression. After some days, the Afghans conquered Shamsabad and Kannauj. Babur reached Kannauj on February 25, but found the resistance of the Afghans (February 27). On March 13, Babur got built a bridge and crossed the river. The Afghans finding their resistance in vain decamped. The Mughals pursued them to Oudh. Thus for some time, the Afghan danger was averted.

Soon Mahmud Lodhi joined hands with other Afghan nobles and was accepted as their ruler. Babur reached Dakdaki, a pargana of Kara on the banks of the Ganga on January 20, 1529 A.D. Here he got the information that the Afghans had organized a three-pronged drive:

(i)                  Biban and Bayazid were sent towards Sarwar;

(ii)               Sultan Mahmud and Fateh Khan Sharwani along with 1,00,000 Afghans were coming towards Chunar along the Ganges;

(iii)       Sher Khan Sur along with his men had crossed the river and was marching towards Benaras.

On March 23, Babur reached Chunargarh, and hurried forward when he was informed of Mahmud Lodhi’s appearance at Son. On reaching Ghazipur, Babur received the submissive letters from Mahmud Khan Lohani, Jalal Khan, Farid Khan and Sher Khan Sur. The Afghan rebels then sought refuge in Bengal. Babur was in friendly relations with Nusrat Shah, ruler of Bengal. As he was interested in waging a war against Nusrat, Babur opened negotiations with him demanding

(i)                  not to give shelter to the Afghan rebels; and

(ii)                to open the passage for the Mughals.  

However, the Bengal ruler denied accepting these terms. Then Babur declared that if any unpleasant circumstances occurred, Nusrat Shah himself would be responsible for those.

Babur, after his meeting with the ‘Council of War’, decided to cross the Ganges, which was done on May 1. On 4^th May, the Mughals attempted to cross the Ghagra. The Afghans put strong resistance against the Mughals. On 6^th May, the issue was finally decided in the battle of Ghagra. The Mughals used their artillery. Lanepoole concludes, “Good generalship had once more guided valour to victory.” It was a battle which, according to Dr. R.P. Tripathi, “broke the back of the Afghan rebels.”

In this way, Babur overcame the difficulties he had to face in way of establishing his rule in North India. His success over these problems made him definitely the ruler of the North. He crushed the power of the Rajputs and the Afghans, but not for ever. The Afghans had soon after Babur’s death, organized themselves under Sher Khan Sur and re-established the Afghan rule. S.M. Jaffar concludes, “The net result of Babur’s victories in India was that the Afghans were crushed, the Rajput supremacy was shattered, the Mughal Empire was founded and Babur was the master of almost the whole of Northern India.”

The Administration of Sher Shah Sur

According to Dr. J.N. Chaudhry, “Not only did he (Sher Shah) establish an empire by dint of his great military skill, wonderful courage, ability and resourcefulness, but with his usual skill and promptitude, he made necessary arrangements for its smooth and efficient administration.” Sher Shah was, no doubt, one of the greatest administrators in the contemporary world. He had “breathed a new spirit in the old institutions and turned them into instruments of popular good.”

The administration of Sher Shah was military in nature but on the same hand he undertook every possible step for the welfare of his subjects. His was a Muslim State, but showed justice to every community. That is why his State is known as the First Muslim Welfare State.

Sher Shah discarded the theory of the decentralization of powers. Although he had nominally to retain some provinces, he dispensed with them altogether as far as administrative purposes were concerned.

Centre:

Sher Shah was the pivot of the Indian administration. He possessed all administrative powers in his own hands, and was thus a despot, but benevolent. As it was unable for one man to look after all the matters of administration, he had a Council of Ministers, who were in charge of all the administrative routine, but possessed “no authority to initiate policy or to propose radical changes in the mode of transacting business or in the administrative set-up.” Sher Shah’s Council of Ministers was:

(i)                  Vakil was the Prime Minister. He looked after the matters of other Departments and generally dealt with the problems which were not directly assignment to others.

(ii)                Wazir was the Finance Minister. He was in charge of the income and expenditure of the empire.

(iii)               Diwan-i-Ariz was the Army Minister, as may be called. He was not the Commander-in-Chief of the army, but was in charge of its recruitment, organization and discipline. He made arrangements for the payment of salaries of the troops and officers, and looked after the disposition of the army on the battle-field. The work of Diwan-i-Ariz was often interfered by Sher Shah.

(iv)              Diwan-i-Risalat was the head of the Foreign Department. He remained in close touch with the ambassadors and envoys sent to and received from foreign States.

(v)                Diwan-i-Insha performed the duties to draft Royal proclamations and dispatches. He was also in charge of government records.

(vi)              Sadr was the highest officer of religion.

(vii)             Diwan-i-Qaza was the ‘chief qazi’ and supervised the administration of justice either in first instance or appeals against the decisions from the courts of provincial qazis.

(viii)           Barid-i-Mamalik was the head of the Intelligence Department. He also made arrangements for the posting of news carriers at various places to carry the royal dak.

The Chief Muhtsib was the religious censor on one hand and supervisor of markets on the other. He must have supervised the collection of jizya also.

However, these Ministers occupied the position of secretaries as they had no power of initiative or final determination of any policy or transacting matters of importance without the orders of the Emperor.

Sher Shah’s daily time-table shows him too busy with his administrative business. But his routine was interrupted by the frequent warfare. All his expeditions claimed his personal attention and he could not devote much attention to the details of the administration. It may be possible that Sher Shah succeeded in infusing his spirit in the routine work of the administration which was carried on as usual by the Secretariat officials at the headquarters.

Provinces:

There is a lot of controversy regarding the administrative division of Sher Shah’s empire. Dr. Qanungo believes that the highest division of his empire was the Sarkar. But Dr. P. Saran observes that his empire was divided into regular provinces. Bengal was the only Province which is said to have been split up into smaller governorships, keeping in view minimizing the ‘chances of rebellion.’

There were military governorships in cases of Ajmer, Malwa and the Punjab. Bengal was at first administered likewise, but the lesson of a bitter experience in this distant province taught him to adopt a more prudent measure and he abolished the post of the military-governor, dividing the whole province into several Sarkars. Amin-i-Bangala or the Civilian Viceroy was appointed at the top for the smooth running of the administration.

Sarkars:

The Provinces were divided into a number of Sarkars. The chief officers of a Sarkar were:

(a)    Shiqdar-i-Shiqdaran was in charge of law and order in the Sarkar and had a body of troops to assist him in his work. He also tried criminal cases and supervised the work of the Shiqdars in his jurisdiction.

(b)   Munsif-i-Munsifan tried civil cases, specially arising out of revenue matters. He also supervised the work of the Pargana Amins.

(c)    There was a Qazi for every Sarkar.

Parganas:

The Sarkars were further divided into a number of Parganas. The main officers were:

(a)    Shiqdar was a military officer in charge of a small contingent of troops. He was to maintain peace in his jurisdiction and punish the rebels. He was also to assist the Amin.

(b)   Amin (Munsif) was to make the arrangements for the settlement of the land-revenue.

(c)    Fotadar was the treasurer of the Pargana.

(d)   Karkun kept the accounts of the Pargana. There were two Karkuns in every Pargana. One kept the accounts in Persian, while the other kept in Hindi.

Villages:

Sher Shah had kept contact with the villages through the village officials – the Patwari and the Chowkidar. The elders of the village constituted a Panchayat, which maintained peace and order in their respective villages and worked for the public welfare.

Military Administration:

The military administration of Sher Shah is note-worthy. The Afghans from all parts of the country were invited and given posts according to their merit. Considering the inefficiency of the feudal system, he followed the system of Ala-ud-Din Khalji and established a permanent standing army, paying partly by grant of jagirs and partly in cash from the royal treasury.

Sher Shah, as a matter of fact, took personal interest in the army and recruited troops and fixed the salaries of individual soldiers.

In order to prevent the troops from selling away the government horses and exchanging them with worthless ponies, he promulgated the practice of branding horses --- a fine system of Ala-ud-Din. The practice of recording the descriptive roll of every soldier was instituted, so as to do away with the practice of sending proxies at the time of military review. Prof. Qanungo writes that the credit of organizing the Indian army on a new model goes to Ala-ud-Din, and it was Sher Shah, who following his foot-steps, established a well-organized army of his times. Promotion of the soldiers depended on their merit. Sher Shah had, in fact, not abolished the jagir system completely.

Sher Shah’s army chiefly consisted of cavalry, but he had also infantry armed with muskets. It is recorded that he had always 1,50,000 horses and 25,000 infantry armed with either matchlocks or bows, present with him. In his elephant-sheds, he had 5,000 elephants. Besides this, he had kept contingents of troops posted at strategic places all over his kingdom. The army was divided into divisions, each under a veteran commander. He allowed his troops to come into close contact with him.

Revenue System:

The revenue of the Sher Shah empire can be divided into two parts:

(a)    Central Revenue: Its sources were heirless property, commerce, mint, presents, inheritance, salt, jizya, khams, and land revenue. The vassals and nobles, officials and visitors made presents to the ruler. Jizya was collected from the non-Muslims. Khams was the 20% of the plunder taken during the war.

(b)   Local Revenue: It was taken from abwabs levied on production and consumption of various trader professions and transport.

The Land revenue was the most important source of income. Dr. J.N. Chaudhry states that it was his land-revenue administration which has given undying fame to him. The land revenue was realized 1/3 of the total production. The view of Moreland is, “The historical importance of Sher Shah’s methods lies in the fact that they formed that starting point of the series of experiments in administration which marked the first half of Akbar’s reign.” Sher Shah classified all cultivable land and fixed the revenue. Patta and Qabuliyat were also introduced.

Justice:

“Justice is the most excellent of religious rites and it is approved alike by the Kings of infidels and of the faithful,” was the observation of Sher Shah. Therefore, he established a very efficient judicial system. Sher Shah himself held court in the evening of every Wednesday. Next to him was the Chief Qazi, head of the justice administration, while the Chief Munsif administered civil justice in the district. The Munsifs administered the same in the Parganas.

Sher Shah was deeply furnished with his administration of justice. In justice, he saw no kith and kin and saw everybody with the same eye. He did not hesitate punishing even his nephew, who threw a betel leaf at the wife of a goldsmith who was taking her bath inside her house. He compensated the peasants when their crops were destroyed during the marches of the royal troops. Nizam-ud-Din Ahmed records that during the reign of Sher Shah, a merchant could travel or sleep in the desert, without any fear of being robbed of his merchandise. So great was his fear and his love of justice.

Sher Shah inflicted very severe punishments on the convicts, and was an ‘Angel of Death’ to the robbers, thieves and dacoits.

Police:

In the period of Sher Shah, the duty of the police was rendered by the army. In the Sarkar, the Chief Shiqdar maintained peace and order. The Shiqdar performed the same duty in the Parganas. They had to keep an eye on the disturbers of peace and order and punish them. Sher Shah made a headman of every village and similar services were to be performed by these persons. If they failed in their service, the punishment due to the convicts was given to them. The result was that these officers took every step possible to maintain peace and order in their respective jurisdictions. Dr. A.L. Srivastava comments, “The system was based on the correct knowledge of the rural psychology and the condition of the people of medieval times.” Abbas Khan Sarwani also narrates, “In the time of Shar Shah’s rule a decrepit old woman might place a basket full of gold ornaments on her head and go on a journey and no theif or robber would come near her for fear of punishment which Sher Shah inflicted.”

Intelligence Department:

Sher Shah appointed an officer known as Darogha-i-Dak Chauki for his Intelligence Department. A number of news-writers and news-carriers were kept under him to give him accounts of daily happenings in their regions. This Department worked so well that Dr. A.L. Srivastava writes, “Much of the success of Sher Shah’s administration was due to the efficiency of his spy system.”

Sher Shah was “undoubtedly one of the greatest statesmen among the Sultans of Delhi.” But as Dr. R.P. Tripathi writes, “Although he ruled well and justly, he was primarily the ruler of the Afghans. His reforms were certainly calculated to bring uniformity in administration and unity in the empire, establish closer contacts between the provinces and encourage tolerance to some extent. But he did nothing positive which could create enthusiasm among or inspire his non-Muslim subjects to honour him as their ruler.”

Be as it may, it cannot be denied that Sher Shah had brought law and order in the country by his efficient administrative machinery. Since the reign of Feroz Tughlaq, Sher Shah was the first ruler who established internal peace to a great extent. His reorganization of administration and settlement of land revenue mark him as one of the greatest rulers of the medieval India. Dr. A.L. Srivastava finds the secret of his greatness as a ruler in the spirit he brought to his administration. Even V.A. Smith observed, “If Sher Shah had been spared he would have established his dynasty, and the ‘Great Mughals’ would not have appeared on the stage of history.”

Babur was a great General but not an administrator

Zahir-ud-Din Mohammad Babur is regarded as one of the greatest military generals and conquerors in the world. During his life time, he found himself busy in the constant battles. The result was that in due course he came out to be one the greatest military generals of his time. His initial failures had taught him so many lessons of success. ‘Failures are the stepping stones to success’ prove to be true in Babur’s case. He had been defeated many a times for Samarqand. He conquered Samarqand thrice but to lose it all the times. His defeat in Sar-i-Pul taught him the significance of the Tulughama. In every failure was hidden the secret of his ultimate success.

An able general is regarded the one who cares for his soldiers, and Babur was one amongst them. He himself suffered pains but never thought for his pleasures and comforts while his soldiers were suffering natural calamities. An example can be cited from Babur’s Memoirs, when after one of his expeditions, he was trapped in a snow-fall and was forced to take shelter in a small mountain cave. His soldiers requested him to go inside and have some rest, but Babur did not agree with them and asked them to share the cave with them. He writes: “I felt that for me to be in warm shelter and comfort whilst my men were in the snow and drift, for me to be sleeping at ease inside, whilst my men were in misery and distress, was not a man’s act, and far from comradeship. What strong man can stand I would stand; for, as the Persian proverb says, ‘In the company of friends, Death is a nuptial feast.’ So I remained in the snow and wind in the hole that I had dug out, with snow four hands thick on my head and back and ears.”  

As a general, Babur also knew the skill of using the time appropriately. His battles in India confirm this theory, as to how excellently he displayed the one-week gap period against Sultan Ibraham. His war-tactics and strategy on the field shows how shrewd general he was. He knew very well how to attack and when. Every time he forced his enemies to take the initiative, and let them crowded there, making them helpless against his strategy. Only then did he start his task, which was made easy for him.

However, he seems to be a complete failure as an administrator. He took no steps to consolidate his conquests in India. He let the prevailing institutions continue in the country. He even failed to conciliate with the people on whom he was to rule, and this Babur himself accepts in his diary.

Babur even failed to utilize properly the treasures he gained from conquered territories. He spent them among the beggars and the members of his nobility. Consequently, the administration was weakened financially, and after his death, his successor Humayun had to face a number of difficulties owing to financial crisis.

He knew the art of winning the hearts of his soldiers (as he did in Kanwaha), but his subjects remained wholly alienated to him. He was to them not a ruler but a dacoit. When he had decided to stay in India, he should have invented new institutions and taken certain steps in the administrative direction, but he did not care for it.

Dr. R.P. Tripathi has tried to defend him on the following points:

(i)                  He got less time to rule.

(ii)                He was a stranger to India.

(iii)               Despite these problems, he had instituted the system of Dak-Chowki, and also had the measurement of land.

But if we look at these points, they do not cope with reality. The system of posting letters was only for the private business of the government and had nothing to do for the public. Also, the measurement of land was not in the entire country, but was limited only around Delhi. Dr. Tripathi’s view of his being a foreigner and stranger to India is also not acceptable. He could undertake measures with the help of able Indians. Moreover, his period of reign was also not brief. Sher Shah Sur also had ruled for less than five years. During this period also, he was engaged in numerous battles, yet “he had breathed a new spirit in the old institutions and turned them into instruments of popular good.”

Sir E.D. Ross states that Babur held a high place among the sovereigns of his age. V.A. Smith calls him the “most brilliant Asiatic prince of his age and worthy of a high place among the sovereigns of any age or country.” Babur was, no doubt, one of the greatest military generals of his time. He achieved many successes on the battle-field, but as a statesman he remained a complete failure.  

Course of the First Battle of Panipat

After his repeated failures in Samarqand, Babur was attracted towards Hindustan. Taking advantage of the political conditions in India, which was “a congeries of States” and “parceled out among numerous mutually warring States”, Babur attacked it five times during 1519 A.D. to 1525 A.D. Thus state Edwards and Garrett, “As had happened more than once in past history, the internal dissensions of the country made it an easy prey to a determined invader.”

In November 1525 A.D, Babur set out from Kabul for his Indian conquest. After his conquest of Punjab, defeating its governor Daulat Khan Lodhi, the Mughal invader advanced towards Delhi. He writes, “As it was always in my heart to possess Hindustan, and as these several countries had once been held by the Turks, I pictured them as my own and was resolved to get them into my own hands, whether peacefully or by force.” Babur’s ambitions clashed with those of Sultan Ibraham Lodhi of Delhi. Although it was a difficult task to perform, as he had to take a battle against the central power of the country, yet he was not discouraged: “Having placed my foot on the stirrup of resolution and my hands on the reins of confidence in God, I marched against Sultan Ibraham…..”

The Mughal forces reached the town of Panipat on 29^th Jamadi, 932 Hijri (April 12, 1528 A.D.). Probably the same time, the Sultan had also reached there along with his troops. For about a week, both the armies stood facing each other, but neither took the offensive.

There is a controversy regarding the numerical strength of the Mughals. While Babur in his Memoirs accepts it 12 thousand, Rushbrooke Williams gives the number 8 thousand. However, the most accepted view is that the Mughal troops were numbered not less than 25 thousand against one lakh Afghans with 1,000 horsemen, at a ratio of 4:1. Ferishta is of the opinion that the Afghan horsemen numbered 100 and not one thousand.

Babur in his Memoirs accepts that before the battle, his army had lost its courage: “Many of the troops were in great tremor and alarms. Trepidation and fear are always unbecoming; whatever the Almighty has decreed from eternity cannot be reversed. At the same time I cannot blame them; they had some reason of anxiety, for in two or three months they had travelled from their native land and were now to engage in arms a nation of whom they knew nothing.”

Before the start of the battle, there was a week’s gap. Babur utilized the time efficiently and his major success in this period lies in making his men courageous to fight. He took a defensive line-up, drawing up his army in a long line. On his right, stood the town and the suburbs of Panipat. From the left, he defended himself by ditches, the felled trees and thorny shrubs. The centre was defended by 700 carts, connected by twisted bull-hides; between every pair of guns were five to seven movable breast-works (tura) for the protection of the matchlock men. At fixed intervals, open space was left for 100 to 200 horsemen to charge abreast. In the Centre (ghul) stood Babur in person. His major commanders were Humayun and Khwaja Khan on the Right; Mohammad Sultan Mirza and Mahdi Khwaja on the Left; Chin Timur Sultan in the Right-Centre (ung-ghul); and the Prime Minister Mir Ali Khalifa in the Left-Centre (sul-ghul). The Tulughama party was under the Mongol chiefs and was standing on the extreme right and left. Their duty was to take the enemy in rear. At a little distance behind the line was the Reserve of picked horsemen under Abdul Aziz.

On the other end, Ibraham Lodhi had also taken the field and divided his army into four divisions: Centre, Right Wing, Left Wing and Advance Guard. The fighting experience and the resources of the Afghan army was not contemporary, but much of the ancient times. Moreover, Ibraham Lodhi made a great blunder as he did not utilize even a minute of that one week period in completing and reviewing his military preparations. Keene has nicely distinguished the two armies – “On one side were the courage of despair and something of the resources of scientific warfare; on the other side, men-at-arms of the medieval type with crowded ranks of supermen and archers thronging on in foolhardy disorder.”

On Thursday, 7^th Rajab, 932 Hijri (i.e. April 19, 1526 A.D.), the Sultan celebrated a Jashan (merry making) and distributed immense wealth among his men. In the meantime, Babur had militarily prepared himself and wanted Ibraham to take offensive, who seemed to be in no such mood.

Next night i.e. on 20^th April, Babur ordered his four or five thousand soldiers to make a night attack upon the Afghans. Although the attack failed, yet it fulfilled Babur’s objectives. Next day (21^st April), the Afghans rushed towards the Mughal camp. They moved so breezily covering the four mile distance in a bit three hours. However, they fell in confusion when found the front line defense of Babur, and immediately checked their speed. In due course, the formation of the Afghan army was badly broken and was crowded in the Centre. This was what Babur exactly wanted. He then directed his Tulughamas to take the enemy in flank and rear. The Left Wing of the Mughals was marching unconsciously and was surrounded by the Afghans.

Babur, a great military general, was very keenly observing his men’s movements and found his Left Wing in great difficulty. He immediately directed his Centre to support the Left. In due course, the Right also had to experience some hard moments and the Right-Centre was sent to its assistance. Then Babur ordered Ustad Ali, the master gunner, to do the magic, who was well supported by the cannoneer, Mustafa, on the Left-Centre. The Afghans, at this stage, were surrounded on all sides, facing arrows on either flank and the rear and fire-shots from the front. They found themselves helpless against the Mughals and were crowded in the centre.

All the friends and the companions of the Sultan had fallen around him. Mahmud Khan, one of his companions, advised him to run away and save his life. However, the Sultan considered it disgraceful to run away from the field of his ‘death’ where thousands of his loyals had sacrificed their lives for him. He wanted to die not the death of cowardice but of a soldier, a true soldier and a true king. He marched to the Front with his 4,000 loyal soldiers and fought like a brave warrior, but was ultimately killed. The Afghans took to flight. The Mughals sued them and massacred many of them.

Babur, having won this historic battle, rushed to Delhi and sent Prince Humayun to take control of Agra and its treasures. Thus observes Babur: “The sun had mounted spear-high when the onset began, and the battle lasted till mid-day, when the enemy were completely broken and routed and my people victorious and triumphant. By the grace and mercy of Almighty God this difficult affair was made easy to me.” About 50,000 Afghans are supposed to have been killed in the battle.

The first battle of Panipat was thus a decisive battle which decided the Fate of India. With this battle, the rule of the Afghan Sultanate came to an end and the Mughals made their way for the establishment of their empire in India. S. Lanepoole has very accurately pointed out, “To the Afghans of Delhi, the battle of Panipat was their Cannae. It was the ruin of their dominion, the end of their power.”

Causes of Babur’s success:

A variety of factors can be enumerated for Babur’s success against the Afghans at Panipat. Babur was a great and an experienced military general. There is no exaggeration in the observation that he was brought up in the battle-fields. He had adopted a number of war-tactics during his constant wars in Central Asia. The utilization of Tulughama was taken to task after he came across Shaibani Khan in the battle of Sar-i-Pul in 1501 A.D. He knew very well how, when and where to strike. Another vital example of his brilliant leadership can be seen in his organization of the army and making proper arrangements for the support to that division he found in difficulty. S.M. Jaffar comments, “Babur was a scientific general, skillful in planning and thorough in execution.” Lanepoole completes this observation, “Babur’s generalship had much to do with the successful issue.” On the other hand, Babur himself believed of his rival that he was “an inexperienced youngman, careless in his movements, who marched without order, halted or retired without method and engaged without foresight.”

The numerical strength of the Afghans was much more than that of the Mughals. However, number does not matter unless it is well-experienced and well equipped in arms etc. The Afghans, though more than a lakh in numbers, were not as experienced as the Mughals were. They stood in the midst of the battle-field as if standing in a fair.

On the other hand, Babur adopted such war-tactics that the enemy was found in a gear. The masterly utilization of a week’s gap before the battle and the Tulughama war-tactics made it easy for Babur to achieve success.

Babur had appeared at Panipat with his artillery which was new to the Afghans. They had neither seen nor heard of it. They possessed arrows which were of ancient times. Lanepoole writes, “Arrows cannot answer the bullets and the work was done within few hours.” Dr. Radhey Shyam has also considered this battle as “an unequal contest between fire and man.” Indeed it was Babur’s artillery which played an important role in his victory. According to Rushbrooke Williams, “If there was one single material factor which more than any other conduced to his ultimate triumph in Hindustan, it was his powerful artillery.”

Thus owing to his brilliant leadership, excellent war-tactics, usage of artillery and well organized army – Babur was able to win the battle of Panipat. It was a landmark in the history of India. Dr. Radhey Shyam has given his opinion on the battle in these words: “Babur’s wide experience of warfare and close observation of battles, which he himself had fought against his adversaries or he had heard from others about the way in which his ancestors used to fight,” gave him his victory in the field of Panipat. The battle “testified Babur’s superior generalship, military technique, superb skill and ability to combine effectively the artillery with cavalry…. There is no doubt that the first battle of Panipat was one of the greatest battles ever fought on the soil of Hindustan.”

Political Conditions in India in the beginning of the 16th Century

Dr. Ishwari Prasad has very aptly pointed out that “India was a congeries of States at the beginning of the 16^th century, and likely to be the easy prey of an invader who had the strength  and will to attempt her conquest.” In fact, there was no strong central authority in the country and it was divided into numerous “mutual warring States” to achieve the supremacy of power. Of course, there was no State hesitating to do so, provided it had the required sufficient strength for it. The Indian sub-continent was a disintegrated one, and the advantage of this disintegration was gained by the invader, Babur, as Edwards and Garrett have very wisely reaffirmed, ”As had happened more than once in past history, the internal dissensions of the country made it an easy prey to a determined invader.”

Babur, in his Tuzuq-i-Babari, mentions the political conditions of the country: “At the time when I conquered that country, five Mussalman kings (of Delhi, Bengal, Malwa, Gujrat and the Bahmanis) and two Pagans (of Mewar and Vijayanagar) exercised the royal authority. Although there were many small and inconsiderable Rais and Rajas in the hills and woody country, yet these were the chief and the only ones of importance.”

I.                   Delhi: The Central Power: The first Muslim ruler mentioned by Babur is the Sultan of Delhi. In the beginning of the 16^th century, it was under the rule of Sikander Lodhi (1489 – 1517 A.D.), who had succeeded his father, Bahlol (1452 – 1489 A.D.). Sikander proved to be a successful ruler, although by his dogmatic policy he lost the confidence of the non-Muslim subjects, yet succeeded in winning the hearts of his chiefs and nobles, upon whose support his power rested.

In 1517 A.D., Sikander was succeeded by Ibraham Lodhi, on whose accession, comments Ahmed Yadgar, “many nobles became aware of his fieble disposition and raised the standard of opposition.” In fact, he lacked all those qualities which were essential for a ruler. As the chiefs and soldiers were satisfied with Sikander, the situation had totally changed under Ibraham. It was under him that the Afghans were divided on the question of the Division of Empire. Many nobles stood to revolt against him. All this was because of his proud and suspicious nature. He even adopted a very stern policy against his own relatives and chiefs, and even declared that ‘kingship knows no kinship’. The result was that Punjab and Jaunpur openly started rebellious activities. Therefore, Rushbrooke Williams writes, ”Not only did he alienate his nobles upon whose support his power rested, not only did he drive into active opposition the very men he ought to have conciliated at all hazards, but to make matters worse, he attempted to play the tyrant.”

II.                Other States in the North

(A) Muslim Zonal States-

1.      Towards the East of Delhi:

(a)    Jaunpur: In 1473 A.D, Bahlol Lodhi defeated the Sharqi ruler of Jaunpur, and since this period the State was under the Delhi Sultan. But in 1517 A.D, Jalal Khan led a revolt against his brother, Sultan Ibraham. However, the revolt was crushed. Jalal Khan was imprisoned while trying to flee, and the Sultan got him murdered privately, when he was being taken to Hansi.

(b)   Bihar: Immediately after the accession of Ibraham Lodhi to the throne, the Eastern region openly raised the revolt. The Afghans in Bihar formed independent State under Darya Khan Lohani, who remained its ruler in the first quarter of the 16^th century.

(c)    Bengal: Nasir-ud-Din Nusrat Shah of the Hussain dynasty was the ruler of Bengal. He was a very efficient and capable administrator and also a very ambitious person In the East, he was the most powerful ruler and by 1521 A.D, he had extended his kingdom to Monghyr and Hajipur. He was very popular among his subjects and was the first Muslim ruler in Bengal to form the composite culture there. He got some Hindu books, including the Mahabharata translated into Bengali.

2.      In the South-West of Delhi

(a)   Malwa: About the ruler of Malwa, Babur writes, “Sultan Mahmud reigned in the country of Malwa, which they likewise call Mandu. This dynasty was Khalji. Rana Sanka, a Pagan, had defeated them and occupied a number of their provinces. This dynasty had also become weak.”

In 1519 A.D, during the rule of Mahmud II, Malwa fell into the hands of a Rajput, Medini Rai. He gave all the high posts to the Rajputs, which caused jealousy to Mahmud II and other Muslims. Mahmud got help from Muzaffar Shah of Gujrat, but Medini Rai with Rana Sanga’s support defeated Mahmud, but restored him to his throne.

(b)   Gujrat: It was ruled by the Tang race. In the opening of the 16^th century, its ruler was Mohammad Begarha (1458 – 1511 A.D.), the greatest ruler of Gujrat. He was succeeded by Muzaffar Shah II, the contemporary ruler of Babur’s invasions. For him, Babur writes, “He was a prince, well skilled in learning and fond of reading the hadis. He was constantly employed in writing the Koran.” He was defeated by Mewar’s Rana Sanga in 1519 A.D. His death in 1526 A.D caused political confusion in the State.

3.      Towards North-West of Delhi

(A) The Muslim States:

(a)   Punjab: During the first quarter of the 16^th century, Punjab was a part of the Delhi Sultanate. Its governor, Daulat Khan Lodhi, had become a rebel because of the stern policy of Sultan Ibraham. He started making preparations to assume independence and in order to accomplish his ambitions, he sought help from Babur, and invited him to invade India. Dr. A.L. Srivastava writes, “The north-western province of the Sultanate was thus not in a position to put up any resistance against a foreign invader.”

(b)   Kashmir: Zain-ul-Abidin (1420 – 1470A.D.), the Sultan of Kashmir, adopted the policy of religious toleration and is known as the Akbar of Kashmir. Mohammad Shah remained the ruler of Kashmir from 1499 A.D. to 1526 A.D. However, Kashmir did not play any important role in the politics of Northern India.

(c)    Sind: The Sumras ruled over Sind up to 1521 A.D, when its ruler Feroz was defeated by Shah Beg Arghun, the ruler of Qandahar and laid the foundation of the Arghun dynasty. He was succeeded by his son, Shah Hussain, who also annexed Multan.

(B)  The Hindu States

(a)   Orissa: Orissa was ruled by Rudra Pratap Dev during this period. No Muslim ruler was successful in defeating this State. Though Orissa was not interested in the politics of Northern India, it remained in constant wars against the Muslim State of Bengal in the east and the Hindu State of Vijayanagar in the South.

(b)   Mewar: The ruler of Mewar was the lion hearted Rajput, Rana Sangram Singh, better known as Rana Sanga, who according to Babur “has attained his present high eminence only in these later times by his own valor and his sword. His original principality was Chittor. During the confusion that prevailed among the princes of the kingdom of Mandu, he seized a number of provinces which had depended on Mandu, such as Rantpur, Sarangpur, Bhilsan and Chanderi.”

Rana Sanga was the head of the Rajput clan of his times and the most superior power in India. He was an experienced warrior who had fought 18 pitched battles against the rulers of Malwa and Delhi. He was a great diplomat and an ambitious ruler. With the assistance of other Hindu rulers of the Central Provinces, he wanted to establish the Hindu rule in the entire North, overthrowing the Muslim States. For his ambitious task he even joined hands with Babur against Ibraham Lodhi.

III.             States in South India

1.      Muslim Zone

(a)   Khandesh: The territory of Khandesh lay between the rivers Narmada and Tapti. Gujrat had been trying to annex Khandesh, resulting to which both the States remained in constant wars. Since 1508 A.D, there was no stability in the politics of Khandesh. Adil Khan III was the ruler of Khandesh till 1520 A.D, and was succeeded by Mohammad I. Khandesh showed no interest in the politics of North India, because of the long distance between Delhi and Khandesh

(b)   Bahmani Kingdom: Mahmud Gawan was an able Prime Minister of the Bahmani Kingdom. However, immediately after his death in 1481 A.D, the downfall of the Kingdom started. After 1482 A.D, it split into five independent States: (i) Ahmednagar, (ii) Bijapur, (iii) Golconda, (iv) Bidar, and (v) Berar. These States remained in constant mutual warfare, and also against the Hindu Vijayanagar Empire.

In the Bahmani States, there were two factions consisting of

(i)   Indian nobles – who were the native Muslims, and

(ii)  Turkish nobles – who came from Central Asian territories.

These political factions resulted into the political confusion in the States. Internally, as well as externally, the position was not very good.

2.      Hindu State of Vijayanagar: Vijayanagar was the most extensive Hindu State in India. During the opening of the 16^th century, it was under the Saluva dynasty (1490 A.D. – 1505 A.D.) and was succeeded by the Taluva dynasty. Krishnadeva Raya (15009 A.D. – 1530 A.D.) was the greatest ruler of this empire. He was a great diplomat and an able economist. Militarily, the State was extremely strong under his rule. It can be noted by the fact that he defeated the Bahmanis many a times. He w as also engaged in direct clashes with Orissa and Mysore.

3.      Advent of a foreign power : Portuguese

The Portuguese were a newly established foreign power in the South. Albuquerque was an undaunted Governor of the Portuguese. In 1510 A.D, the Portuguese defeated the Bahmanis, annexed Goa from them and established themselves there.

Military strength: Militarily, India cannot be said to be a weak power at that time, even though it did not face the enemy successfully. Numerically, its strength is estimated to be nearly 7 lakhs. Rana Sanga is believed to have assistance of seven Rajas, nine Raos, 104 chieftains with titles of Rawat and Rawal, 500 war-elephants, 80,000 horsemen, adding to it unlimited cavalry. Thus in numbers, Indian army was not weak. But number never cares for the military power of a country. In case of India, lack of unity and the inexperience of the Indians was the major reason of the weakness of India’s military strength. For Sultan Ibraham Lodhi, Babur writes, he “was an inexperienced young man, careless in his movements, who marched without order, halted or retired without method and engaged without foresight.”

The Indian States were not equipped with modern arms, which had weakened them militarily. Moreover, the Jagirdari system was also the worse. Dr. A.L. Srivastava has summed up the military conditions of India as: “Though there was no dearth of soldierly talent, we lagged behind other countries in matter of military progress, qualities and caliber of weapons and development of tactics. … The fortification and defense of the north-western frontier was completely neglected. The military condition of the country was thus far from satisfactory.”

Thus the political conditions in India were far from satisfactory during the opening of the 16^th century. There was not a single State to face an invader successfully. What we find in the politics is the attempts made to fulfill the selfish motives by the native chiefs and nobles. Prof. Rushbrooke Williams sums up the conditions in these words, “The Muhammedan powers were weak, distracted by their own divisions; the Rajput confederacy, led by Mewar, was almost ready to seize the empire which lay within its grasp. But the Fates willed otherwise. That Sangram Singh was cheated of his prize, that the forces of Islam were re-established, that the Rajputs were doomed to endure rather than enjoy.”