The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 proved to be a momentous and decisive event in the modern history of Far East. Apart from enabling Japan to revise her unequal treaties with the Western Powers and stimulating Japanese imperialism and exposing the ever growing weakness of China leading to the birth of anti-Manchu and pro-reform movement in the country, this war set in motion a process which has variantly been described as the “Battle of Concessions”, “Scramble for Concessions”, or “Cutting of the Chinese Melon” -- among the Powers of Europe and the West.
From Japan’s victory, it appeared to these powers that the Chinese Empire was falling to pieces. It was about to become another Africa, the booty of the powers. The idea of the partition of China gained ground; the nations began to scramble for spoil. There followed the struggle for concessions, for leased territories, for spheres of influence, which disregarding Chinese integrity seemed to promise only the imminent partition of the Empire.
Russia taking the initiative along with France and Germany, six days after the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimonesky, according to which South-East Manchuria was ceded to Japan by China, intervened to force Japan in giving up these gains. She did secure from China the island of Taiwan and the neighbouring islands.
It is very interesting to note that the Powers had undertaken this great step not sympathetically towards China but, in fact, they had their own axes to grind. In the true sense, their interests in various sectors in China were to clash with those of Japan. So they declared that in the name of peace in the Far East, it was their advice to Japan to renounce its possession of the Peninsula of Liao-tung, which “would at the same time render illusory the independence of Korea.” Being aware of ‘an unfriendly European intervention’, Japan accepted the advise.
Russia had won the point. It had opened the gates of what she desired. She had posed as the friend of China and won her goodwill, though the real cause of her intervention was her clash of interests with Japan in the Far-East. Again, she was aware of the growing economic needs of China due to war and corruption in the administration, which could be solved only through foreign loans.
Taking advantage of all this, Russia invited China’s ablest statesman of the time, Li Hung Chang, in 1896 at St. Petersburg, and by impressing upon him the friendliness of Russia towards China, persuaded him to sign the famous treaty of Lilo Vanu in 1896. The alliance was specifically directed against Japan, and the two agreed to support each other reciprocally, declare war or peace in common against the said country. In the case of war against Japan, China allowed Russia to use her ports promising to provide all necessary facilities. China also allowed Russia to construct tans-Siberian Railway across Northern Manchuria directly to Vladivostok. Russia assured China of her non-aggression towards the Chinese territory. In another term, Russia promised loan to China on easy instalments to help her pay war-indemnity to Japan.
To fulfill these obligations, a Russo-Chinese Bank was established in China which, as described in its charter, was to be agency to collect taxes, finance the business of local government, coin money and secure commercial and industrial concessions as well as the right to construct and extend railways and telegraph. The opinion of Dr. H.M. Vinacke is that “although organized and controlled under Russian law, the Russo-Chinese Bank was to serve as the fiscal agent of the Chinese government in addition to undertaking the work of financing rail-roads and other projects to Manchuria.”
The railway was to be under the joint control of Sino-Russian company for 80 years after which it was to become the property of China. However, it was narrated that should the Government of China wish to redeem the road at the beginning of the 37th year, she would have to pay a sum of at least 700 million rubles, but it seemed improbable that China would ever try to occupy it after such a huge payment.
After sometime, Russia consolidated her gains by further concessions. She got the ease of Port Arthur for 15 years with the condition that it will be opened only to the warships of China and Russia. She also got for 15 years Kiao-Chao as a naval base. She also got certain more favourable rights such as maintenance of law and order. Moreover, she got mining rights in Southern Manchuria.
The pace set by Russia was followed by Germany who also extracted concessions. She had already given notice to Russia and France about her desire to get concessions in China of port or ports where German ships could anchor, carry out repairs and get food supplies. Capitalizing on the situation created by the murder of two German missionaries in Shantung, Germany sent a strong naval squadron to Kiao-Chao and forced China to sign a treaty on March 6, 1898. The Treaty remarked that “The Imperial Chinese Government consider it advisable to give a special proof of their grateful appreciation of the friendship shown to them by Germany.”
- Germany got lease of Kiao-Chao Bay and adjacent territories for 99 years.
- She was to have full jurisdiction in the leased territory.
-Germany got free passage for her troops in the neutral zone up to 50 kilometres outside the leased area.
- Germany’s special claims in Shantung for any foreign aid were recognized.
- No Chinese or foreign control over German armies in neutral territory.
- Germany could not ‘sublet’ the territory leased to her.
- China would cede to Germany a more suitable place in the event the Germans returned the territory before the expiry of the lease period.
- China would construct Shantung Railway under a German company.
- Germany was given the right to take out coal from mines within 10 miles of Shantung.
France also followed the suit and compelled China to grant her concessions in the Treaty of 1898. She had already in 1895, secured a statement from China that she would not hand over the island of Hanan to any other power in lease. She had gained a concession in customs’ charging on goods entering China from the French dependencies in the South and also an opportunity to exploit the mines of Yunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung Provinces. She also got the permission to extend the Annam railway into Chinese territory. But now in 1898, she furthered her interests:
- France was to get all facilities for the construction of Tongking-Yunnan railway.
- She got lease for 99 years of Kwangchao with the right to keep troops and extract coal.
- French advisers for Chinese postal service.
Britain alarmed at these developments, particularly on Russia’s growing influence in Peking, enforced a series of some agreements upon China during February to July 1898, according to which:
- She got the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei for the same period for which Russia possessed Port Arthur.
- Extension of the lease of the main territory opposite Hongkong.
- Boundaries of Burma were revised in her favour.
- Territories on Yang-Tse river not to be leased to any other power.
- A British national to be Inspector-General of customs.
- Lease of Formosa for 99 years.
- Right to construct railway up to 2800 miles (9 railroad concessions) was given to Britain.
Japan also made an agreement with China according to which the latter was not to alienate the Province of Fukien, lying across Formosa, to any other power. It was accepted by China.
Italy was the last to demand concessions from China, but being the weakest power, failed to get any. China boldly refused to comply with her wishes.
Thus it is evident from the preceding study that an acute struggle for concessions from China followed among the Europeans and the West after the Sino-Japanese War. The powers were now busy to secure their spheres of interest. Vinacke writes, “Each one of the power proceeded to secure from the others the fullest possible recognition of its exclusive interest in the area claimed by it for exploitation.” Clyde and Beers have also narrated that “an era of special and exclusive privilege was dawning in China.” It now appeared that the next logical step would be the partitioning of China among the powers. But this could not be possible partly due to the birth of a strong national and anti-foreign movement in China and partly on account of Hay’s Open Door Notes in which America clearly stated that she would not allow China to close her doors to this or that power in favour of one or the more concession-holding powers. Great Britain, already against the commercial interests within the sphere of interests, and a supporter of the Open Door Policy, greatly welcomed the Hay’s proposals, because in it Britain found the revival of its own Chinese policy of the years 1860 to 1865. Lack of mutual trust and acute rivalry and jealousies among these powers was also responsible for saving China from dismemberment. Thus writes Harold M Vinacke:
“The acceptance of the Hay principles by the Powers temporarily checked the movement toward the partition of China at the first stage of its development. The reaction of the Chinese government and people toward this foreign aggression, however, brought the question of the extinction of Chinese national life again to the front. The lesson of the Sino-Japanese War and the years immediately following was, fundamentally, that China must so reorganize herself that she could successfully defend herself against attacks from the outside. The government’s policy in the past had been to rely for the defence of the country upon the lack of harmony of interest among the European Powers. Russia’s aggressive tendencies, for example, would be held in check, it was thought by Great Britain. One Power could be so played off against another as to safeguard China. This “balance of power” theory, however, broke down in the face of the revelation of China’s weakness, and of the bringing into play of the sphere conception. A Russian alliance, it is true, was accepted to secure China against Japan. But the German demand for a lease-hold, and the acquiescence of the other states in the advance she made, changed the situation materially. The Russian alliance did not cover European aggression, and China found no one to give her active support in the face of the German threat. The ‘balance of power’ idea was invoked certainly, but to the entire disadvantage of China, since each Power demanded compensation for gains made by the others in order that the ‘balance’ should be preserved. Ultimately the action of a foreign state, the United States, did bring some external support to China, but only after the active contestants had stopped to take stock of the situation.”
From Japan’s victory, it appeared to these powers that the Chinese Empire was falling to pieces. It was about to become another Africa, the booty of the powers. The idea of the partition of China gained ground; the nations began to scramble for spoil. There followed the struggle for concessions, for leased territories, for spheres of influence, which disregarding Chinese integrity seemed to promise only the imminent partition of the Empire.
Russia taking the initiative along with France and Germany, six days after the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimonesky, according to which South-East Manchuria was ceded to Japan by China, intervened to force Japan in giving up these gains. She did secure from China the island of Taiwan and the neighbouring islands.
It is very interesting to note that the Powers had undertaken this great step not sympathetically towards China but, in fact, they had their own axes to grind. In the true sense, their interests in various sectors in China were to clash with those of Japan. So they declared that in the name of peace in the Far East, it was their advice to Japan to renounce its possession of the Peninsula of Liao-tung, which “would at the same time render illusory the independence of Korea.” Being aware of ‘an unfriendly European intervention’, Japan accepted the advise.
Russia had won the point. It had opened the gates of what she desired. She had posed as the friend of China and won her goodwill, though the real cause of her intervention was her clash of interests with Japan in the Far-East. Again, she was aware of the growing economic needs of China due to war and corruption in the administration, which could be solved only through foreign loans.
Taking advantage of all this, Russia invited China’s ablest statesman of the time, Li Hung Chang, in 1896 at St. Petersburg, and by impressing upon him the friendliness of Russia towards China, persuaded him to sign the famous treaty of Lilo Vanu in 1896. The alliance was specifically directed against Japan, and the two agreed to support each other reciprocally, declare war or peace in common against the said country. In the case of war against Japan, China allowed Russia to use her ports promising to provide all necessary facilities. China also allowed Russia to construct tans-Siberian Railway across Northern Manchuria directly to Vladivostok. Russia assured China of her non-aggression towards the Chinese territory. In another term, Russia promised loan to China on easy instalments to help her pay war-indemnity to Japan.
To fulfill these obligations, a Russo-Chinese Bank was established in China which, as described in its charter, was to be agency to collect taxes, finance the business of local government, coin money and secure commercial and industrial concessions as well as the right to construct and extend railways and telegraph. The opinion of Dr. H.M. Vinacke is that “although organized and controlled under Russian law, the Russo-Chinese Bank was to serve as the fiscal agent of the Chinese government in addition to undertaking the work of financing rail-roads and other projects to Manchuria.”
The railway was to be under the joint control of Sino-Russian company for 80 years after which it was to become the property of China. However, it was narrated that should the Government of China wish to redeem the road at the beginning of the 37th year, she would have to pay a sum of at least 700 million rubles, but it seemed improbable that China would ever try to occupy it after such a huge payment.
After sometime, Russia consolidated her gains by further concessions. She got the ease of Port Arthur for 15 years with the condition that it will be opened only to the warships of China and Russia. She also got for 15 years Kiao-Chao as a naval base. She also got certain more favourable rights such as maintenance of law and order. Moreover, she got mining rights in Southern Manchuria.
The pace set by Russia was followed by Germany who also extracted concessions. She had already given notice to Russia and France about her desire to get concessions in China of port or ports where German ships could anchor, carry out repairs and get food supplies. Capitalizing on the situation created by the murder of two German missionaries in Shantung, Germany sent a strong naval squadron to Kiao-Chao and forced China to sign a treaty on March 6, 1898. The Treaty remarked that “The Imperial Chinese Government consider it advisable to give a special proof of their grateful appreciation of the friendship shown to them by Germany.”
- Germany got lease of Kiao-Chao Bay and adjacent territories for 99 years.
- She was to have full jurisdiction in the leased territory.
-Germany got free passage for her troops in the neutral zone up to 50 kilometres outside the leased area.
- Germany’s special claims in Shantung for any foreign aid were recognized.
- No Chinese or foreign control over German armies in neutral territory.
- Germany could not ‘sublet’ the territory leased to her.
- China would cede to Germany a more suitable place in the event the Germans returned the territory before the expiry of the lease period.
- China would construct Shantung Railway under a German company.
- Germany was given the right to take out coal from mines within 10 miles of Shantung.
France also followed the suit and compelled China to grant her concessions in the Treaty of 1898. She had already in 1895, secured a statement from China that she would not hand over the island of Hanan to any other power in lease. She had gained a concession in customs’ charging on goods entering China from the French dependencies in the South and also an opportunity to exploit the mines of Yunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung Provinces. She also got the permission to extend the Annam railway into Chinese territory. But now in 1898, she furthered her interests:
- France was to get all facilities for the construction of Tongking-Yunnan railway.
- She got lease for 99 years of Kwangchao with the right to keep troops and extract coal.
- French advisers for Chinese postal service.
Britain alarmed at these developments, particularly on Russia’s growing influence in Peking, enforced a series of some agreements upon China during February to July 1898, according to which:
- She got the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei for the same period for which Russia possessed Port Arthur.
- Extension of the lease of the main territory opposite Hongkong.
- Boundaries of Burma were revised in her favour.
- Territories on Yang-Tse river not to be leased to any other power.
- A British national to be Inspector-General of customs.
- Lease of Formosa for 99 years.
- Right to construct railway up to 2800 miles (9 railroad concessions) was given to Britain.
Japan also made an agreement with China according to which the latter was not to alienate the Province of Fukien, lying across Formosa, to any other power. It was accepted by China.
Italy was the last to demand concessions from China, but being the weakest power, failed to get any. China boldly refused to comply with her wishes.
Thus it is evident from the preceding study that an acute struggle for concessions from China followed among the Europeans and the West after the Sino-Japanese War. The powers were now busy to secure their spheres of interest. Vinacke writes, “Each one of the power proceeded to secure from the others the fullest possible recognition of its exclusive interest in the area claimed by it for exploitation.” Clyde and Beers have also narrated that “an era of special and exclusive privilege was dawning in China.” It now appeared that the next logical step would be the partitioning of China among the powers. But this could not be possible partly due to the birth of a strong national and anti-foreign movement in China and partly on account of Hay’s Open Door Notes in which America clearly stated that she would not allow China to close her doors to this or that power in favour of one or the more concession-holding powers. Great Britain, already against the commercial interests within the sphere of interests, and a supporter of the Open Door Policy, greatly welcomed the Hay’s proposals, because in it Britain found the revival of its own Chinese policy of the years 1860 to 1865. Lack of mutual trust and acute rivalry and jealousies among these powers was also responsible for saving China from dismemberment. Thus writes Harold M Vinacke:
“The acceptance of the Hay principles by the Powers temporarily checked the movement toward the partition of China at the first stage of its development. The reaction of the Chinese government and people toward this foreign aggression, however, brought the question of the extinction of Chinese national life again to the front. The lesson of the Sino-Japanese War and the years immediately following was, fundamentally, that China must so reorganize herself that she could successfully defend herself against attacks from the outside. The government’s policy in the past had been to rely for the defence of the country upon the lack of harmony of interest among the European Powers. Russia’s aggressive tendencies, for example, would be held in check, it was thought by Great Britain. One Power could be so played off against another as to safeguard China. This “balance of power” theory, however, broke down in the face of the revelation of China’s weakness, and of the bringing into play of the sphere conception. A Russian alliance, it is true, was accepted to secure China against Japan. But the German demand for a lease-hold, and the acquiescence of the other states in the advance she made, changed the situation materially. The Russian alliance did not cover European aggression, and China found no one to give her active support in the face of the German threat. The ‘balance of power’ idea was invoked certainly, but to the entire disadvantage of China, since each Power demanded compensation for gains made by the others in order that the ‘balance’ should be preserved. Ultimately the action of a foreign state, the United States, did bring some external support to China, but only after the active contestants had stopped to take stock of the situation.”
