Purpose of Studying History

Every branch of knowledge has some purpose. If a particular branch of knowledge is not serving any purpose, it is of no use. History too serves some purpose and the importance of the subject depends upon the purpose it serves.

History serves the obvious purpose of entertainment by showing how things have come to be as they are.1 Herodotus, the father of history, is full of amusing stories but he has not comprised the dignity of the subject.2 This entertainment value of history is acceptable everywhere in the world.3 People are also interested in history because it provides satisfaction to the curiosity of a person.4 It shows them how things have become what they are and by studying history one may find many things that are unknown to him already.

As in the case of social sciences, the study of history is helpful in the understanding of other disciplines.5 As if we are to study how our present political system has come into existence or if we are to study how our present day social institutions have evolved we are to go to the past, which is the subject matter of history. The same is the case with other disciplines studying society in the present or planning for the future that they cannot function well without a historical perspective.

History only wants to show what happened. “The strict presentation of the facts is the supreme law of historiography.” Historian is to tell the truth, nothing but the truth.6 So when the business of history is to tell the truth or what really happened, it is by history that we learn much about the past. To understand something of the society, culture, politics and economic order of the earlier times, history enables one to rise above his own present circumstances and all this gives awareness and self-understanding.7 We know more than our ancestors knew and we acquire more command over the forces of nature.8

The study of history is also essential for self-knowledge.9 One’s knowledge about oneself is increased, when one learns about the past. History is a human self-knowledge. It is thought that it is of basic importance to man that he should know himself. From history we know what man has done and what he is.10 It is essential for man to increase his own knowledge which is only possible through the study of history because it deals with the past and tells us what had happened. Through history we come to know those things that were not known to us earlier. The study of history is not the study of the isolated past but it is the study of one society in relation to the other i.e. the society of today and that of yesterday.11

The main purpose of the historian is self-understanding. He may want to understand himself, his people, and by understanding the experience of the earlier generations one can become better.12 So by this way history gives us better understanding of ourselves.

History can teach lessons. All writers from Thucydides to modern period are of this view that history teaches lessons. It teaches wise humility; and in the moment of darkness, confusion or pain, it teaches a wise patience.13 It is a pre-supposition of history that man is capable by the experiences of his predecessors and progress in the history rests on the acquired skills which include the capacity to master, transform and utilize one’s environment.14

History, after enquiring into the minds of every order, gives some lessons that are based on wisdom. So it is said that history is a guide for the present and for the future.15 There are critics who say that the events of the past are the unique events and history cannot be generalized. But history, according to E.H. Carr, is not concerned with the unique but with what is general in the unique.16 In history, we cannot separate them. The study of history contains innumerable instances that may find their parallels in other times and places. Therefore, the study of history enables us to draw lessons. For instance, it is from history we learn that whenever there was an undue increase in the land revenue, there were revolts. Thus it is a lesson.

It is also said that from the successes and failures of the people in the past we may learn something to guide our actions in the present. But it is also necessary that value of history, in this sense, should not be over-estimated because conditions of the present are vastly different from those of the past and their ideas and forms of conduct are different from those of the present.17 But it does not mean that we cannot learn anything from history rather we learnt much from it. As in the case of the situation in the Punjab. We have learned that whenever the religious feelings of the Sikhs were hurt, they rose against the authority, whosoever it may be. That is why the Indian government after independence has tried its level best to avoid interference in the religious affairs of the Sikhs. However, when Mrs. Indira Gandhi attacked the Golden Temple, whatsoever the circumstances would have been, there was all round resentment among the Sikhs, which culminated in her murder.

History is a dialogue between the events of the past and progressively emerging future ends.18 It is so because with the passage of time we have come to know much more about the past and with its experience we can suggest something for the future. It is due to history that mankind is moving from good to better.19 It is only on the basis of the past knowledge that we can say something in the present and also mould it to suit the future. But all this is possible if we have grasped the problem fully, i.e. the past of the problem and its every aspect.

The lessons that history offers make it possible to comprehend the events of today and to foresee the future.20 So it is rightly said that future is shaped with the help that past offers.21 It is so that one learns from history, because among other things, it tells us that what were the follies committed in the past and what was its outcome. So one with the experience of the past, moulds one’s coming times to such direction so that nothing should happen in future which must be harmful to the society.

In a nutshell, the dual task of history is to enable man to understand the society in the past and also to increase his mastery over the society of the present.22 To give people full sense of their future one needs to have, first of all, a full sense of one’s past, which is possible only through history.23 Though the past act is dead, yet by re-enacting the thought historically we can use that heritage for our own advancement in future.24 History helps us to understand how the world has developed as it is and also promotes the knowledge of human nature.25 History is invaluable in increasing our knowledge of human nature, because it shows how people may be expected to behave in new situation.26 So history tells us what really has happened in the past and it suggests remedies for the present and guides our future. All this, i.e. to know the past is possible only through history.

References:
1. Jacques Barzun & Henry F. Graff, The Modern Researcher, Harcourt Brace Javanvich, New York 1977, p.11.
2. Bertrand Russel, Understanding History, Philosophical Library, New York 1957, pp. 18-19.
3. Allan Nevins, The Gateway to History, Vora & Co., Bombay 1968, p.21.
4. John C.B. Webster, An Introduction to History, Macmillan, Delhi 1977, p.1.
5. R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, Oxford University Press, New York 1976 (reprint), 205.
6. Hans Meyerhoff, The Philosophy of History in our own times, Doubleday Anchor Books, NewYork 1959, pp. 13- 16.
7. John C.B. Webster, op cit, 165.
8. Bertrand Russel, op cit, 54-55.
9. R.G. Collingwood, op cit, 292.
10. Ibid, 134.
11. E.H. Carr, What is History?, Penguin Books, London 1977 (reprint), p.5.
12. John C.B. Webster, op cit, 24.
13. Allan Nevins, op cit, 19-21.
14. E.H. Carr, op cit, 117.
15. Allan Nevins, op cit, 19-21.
16. E.H. Carr, op cit, 63.
17. Alban G. Widgery, The Meaning of History, George Allan & Unwin, London 1967, pp. 13-14.
18. E.H. Carr, op cit, 121-123.
19. Ibid, 125.
20. L. Vidyasova, “Turning Points of History”, in International Affairs (ed. V.P. Shafranov), Progress Publications, Moscow July 1981, p. 131.
21. John Webster, op cit, 13.
22. E.H. Carr, op cit, 55.
23. Ibid, 58.
24. R.G. Collingwood, op cit, 230.
25. Bertrand Russel, op cit, 10.
26. Ibid, 25.

Maharaja Ranjit Singh's relations with Kangra

Ranjit Singh’s relations with the hill-chiefs in the Panjab are one of his policies of expansionism and annexation. It was the similar policy adopted in the plains. Ever since he occupied Lahore, it was his ambition to unify the small and petty States of the Panjab into a great empire and rule over it. And this ambition of his increased after every conquest.

Ranjit Singh came into contact with the hill chiefs as early as in 1802 A.D. The Kangra chief, Sansar Chand Katoch, performed the dominant personality in the hills. The imperialist designs of Sansar Chand had also made the Lahore ruler his rival. The Katoch chief had clarified his imperialist policy, when he attacked the possessions of Sada Kaur and annexed some. Alarmed by the policy, being followed by Sansar Chand, he responded to the call of request made by the Rani and attacked the Kangra territories. Sansar Chand, finding it impossible for himself to check Ranjit, made peace with him, and agreed to pay nazrana fixed by the Maharaja.
But Ranjit was not content with all this. However, the opportunity he sought was found in 1804. The relations had once again estranged. After having overcome the fear of the Maharaja, he attacked Hoshiarpur and Bajwara. Ranjit Singh ousted the Katoch ruler very easily from these places with the help of his artillery.
All that Ranjit now did was, he kept a vigilant eye over the plans and activities of the Katoch chief. On the other side, the latter smelled danger not only from Ranjit Singh’s side, but the Nepalese under their able general, Amar Singh Thapa, ere on advance towards the Panjab hills. Thapa had established his sovereignty over Chamba, Nurpur, Kotla, Jasrota, Basauli, Jaswan, Mandi, Suket and Kullu. Thus the hill-territories were likely to become an open battlefield among Sansar Chand, Ranjit Singh and Amar Singh Thapa.

Being aware of the danger at the doors, Sansar Chand pretended to establish the relations of friendship and amity with the Sikh ruler. The former opened negotiations with the latter, but had his own dice to play. He promised Ranjit to hand over the fortress of Kangra to him as a reward of driving the Gorkhas away from the Katoch territory. Should Ranjit not be suspected and assuring his goodwill towards him, he sent his son, Anrudh Chand to him as a hostage. In the meantime, Sansar Chand was defeated by the joint forces of Amar Singh and other petty hill-chiefs. So he made a similar offer to Amar Singh provided he ousted the Sikhs. Sansar Chand hoped that in their armed clash, the Sikhs and the Gorkhas would destroy each other, thus keeping the field open for himself.

Ranjit was, however, not a man to fall so easily in the trap lay down by Sansar Chand. The moment he came to know of Sansar Chand’s duplicity, he put his son under arrest. After a fierce battle that ensued between the Gorkhas and the Sikhs, the former were forced to retreat. Thapa opened negotiations for peace. During the negotiations, he proposed to the Maharaja a joint attack against the Rajput hill-chiefs. He also offered the fortress of Kangra as the Sikh ‘share of spoil’. On Ranjit’s denial, he agreed to pay a nazrana of Rs. 1,00,000 and to leave the country, abandoning his conquests on the right side of the Sutlej.

After the expulsion of the Gorkhas, Ranjit Singh asked Sansar Chand to hand over the fort to him. As the Katoch ruler was hesitant to fulfill his promise, he also failed to check the Sikhs occupying it. On August 24, 1809, the Sikhs entered the fort without any sort of resistance and occupied it. Desa Singh Majithia was appointed the Governor of Kangra and other adjoining States.

The annexation of Kangra by the Sikh chief ended the supremacy of the Katochs in the hills. However, the Anglo-Sikh relations also affected Ranjit Singh’s relations towards the hill-states. The treaty of Amritsar (1809) signed between the British and Ranjit Singh had debarred the latter of all his conquests on the eastern side of River Sutlej, but was allowed to extend his domination in the North. Now although Sansar Chand had yielded before the Sikhs, yet he continued to intrigue against them. He secretly opened negotiations with the British government and pleaded them to interfere in his case, and also help him recover him recover his lost possessions. “My object is,” wrote Sansar Chand, “to get my former possessions together with the fort of Kangra restored to me and the administration of justice left in my hands.” The British Government, who did not want to lose the goodwill of his old ally, who held a buffer State between their and the Afghan dominions, however, paid no heed to Sansar Chand’s requests and the matter ended. Thus the intriguous efforts of Sansar Chand had no affect upon the imperialist policy of Ranjit Singh.

William Moorcroft commented in 1823, “He is now poor, and in danger of being wholly subjected to Ranjit Singh. His misfortunes are mainly owing to himself and his decline presents a remarkable contrast to the rise of his neighbour, and now paramount lord, Ranjit Singh.”

Ranjit willed to establish the relations of cordiality with the Katochs. Till his death in 1824, Sansar Chand was allowed to rule over his territories as a tributary of Lahore. His son, Anrudh Chand succeeded him. The Maharaja anted to bring him very close to him by establishing matrimonial relations with the Katochs. In 1828 A.D., the Maharaja offered a proposal for Hira Singh’s (son of Dhian Singh) marriage with Anrudh’s sister. As Anrudh was hesitant, he arranged her marriage with the Raja of Garhwal. After his death, the entire Katoch territories were annexed and the Maharaja assigned suitable jagirs to the legitimate heirs of the Katoch family.

The Maharaja himself established the matrimonial alliance with the Katoch family, when he married two of the daughters of late Raja Sansar Chand at Jawalamukhi. According to the Umdat-ut-Tawarikh, one of those, called Katochan, performed sati at the death of the Maharaja.

Lord Hardinge's policy towards the Panjab

The appointment of Lord Hardinge as the Governor General of India in 1844, took place at a time when the relations between the Kingdom of Lahore and the British India were passing through a very critical phase. The history of their relations could not but arouse the suspicions of the Khalsa as to the intentions of the British towards the Kingdom of Lahore. For Lord Hardinge had already carried a reputation as a war veteran during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. To the eyes of a far seeing student of history it appeared as if the British Government had appointed him purposely, to direct personally the military operations against the Kingdom of Lahore. That was bound to take place in the near future.

That Hardinge was not a pacifist, is proved from his following letter to Major Broadfoot, written in October 1845: “The Panjab must, however, be Sikh or British, and I see no element out of which a Sikh government can possibly be constructed, the delay is merely a postponement of the settlement of the question.” Writing in the same strain, the Governor General continues, “At the same time we must bear in mind that as yet no cause of war has been given. The lull following the laid breeze will last, I think through the cold season and I anticipate no offensive operation.”

This letter of Hardinge clearly shows that the British were not as they publicly professed; mere passive and disinterested spectators of the anarchic condition in the Punjab. They were making systematic preparations for active intervention in the stormy and unstable political position of the Panjab. And in the preparations, the contribution of Hardinge was of no small measure. Within a year of his assuming the office, Hardinge added 23,000 men and 28 pieces of guns distributed among Ludhiana, Ferozepur, Ambala and Meerut to the existing strength of the British garrison on the Panjab frontier, which was about 17,612 men and 66 guns towards the end of the Governor Generalship of Lord Ellenborough. He further assembled 1100 picked horses and mules at Mathura, and 500 elephants, 700 camels and a large number of bullock carts at convenient stations between Kanpur and Sutlej. In September, a flotilla of 60 large sized boats arrived at Ferozepur to be used for a bridge on the Sutlej in the event of a war.

It is thus clear that under the garb of forbearance and defensive preparation the soldier statesman carried on the policy of his predecessors with greater prescience and skill.

The war that broke out in December 1845, between the British and the Kingdom of Lahore was the deliberate outcome of the British imperialistic policy resulting in the ultimate victory of the British. But it may be pointed out here that the victory was as much the result of the valour of the British arms as the treachery of the Sikh commanders like Lal Singh and Tej Singh etc. and in encouraging them to be traitors to their Kingdom, the hand of Hardinge and his subordinates like Henry Lawrence was no less.

The war having broken out, Hardinge a seasoned soldier that he was, took an active part in directing the operations by moving about from place to place. The victory in this war ultimately sided with the British. The road to Lahore lay open to the victors. Having crossed the Sutlej, the Durbar emissaries hastened to tender their submission to Lord Hardinge.

After the war had been won, the task before Hardinge was much more difficult. It was the task of reconstructing the Kingdom of Lahore in a manner that would make it harmless in future. The farsighted Governor General realized that in the presence of a large number of Sikh soldiers spread all over the State, it would be a difficult affair to extend the boundaries of the British India to Indus by direct annexation of the Kingdom of Lahore without a protracted war of sieges. But the inadequate forces at the disposal of Commander-in-Chief prevented him from engaging in that war of sieges. Therefore, he ruled out the policy of annexation at this stage. The deficit in the Ludhiana treasury, the approaching hot weather and the weakened military resources – all combined to deter Hardinge from annexing the Kingdom of Lahore at that juncture.

But short of a nominal annexation, Lord Hardinge shrewdly gained all the advantages of it by arranging the terms of the Treaty of Lahore.

To turn to the treaty itself, by annexing the Jalandhar Doab and rendering the hills independent of the plains, the victors not only struck a deathblow to its weakened resources but destroyed its political stability as well. The articles relating to the reorganization and limitations of their army made it virtually impossible for the Sikhs to recover their former strength. The English right to control the two rivers and the restrictions on the employment of foreigners reduced the internal independence of the Panjab almost to a mockery. Principal S.R. Kohli has aptly described the treaty made with the Durbar on 9th March as “a blend of confiscatory, retributive and repressive clauses in it; the splitting of Ranjit Singh’s compact empire, a part each for the British, for Gulab Singh and the Durbar was already foreshadowed; and the army reduced to 1/3 of its strength.” Hardinge’s own letter to Henry Lawrence, dated 23rd October, 1846 may be quoted with benefit here to show the working of the mind of the Governor General while arranging the terms of the treaty: “The Panjab was never intended to be an independent State. By the clause I added, the chief of State can neither make war nor peace, nor exchange nor sell n acre of territory, nor admit a European officer nor refuse us a thoroughfare through its territories nor in fact perform any act without our permission. In fact, the native Prince is in fetters and our protection and must do our bidding.”

But the Treaty of Lahore did not mark the elimination of Lord Hardinge’s Panjab’s policy; it was just the beginning. In the months that followed, no efforts were spared to further strengthen the control of the British over the Kingdom of Lahore and remove the obstacles whatever and whenever they come in the way. This is clear from the trial and deposition of Lal Singh and tackling of certain other matters.

The Treaty of Bhyrowal gave the copingstone to Hardinge’s Panjab policy. Careful examination of the terms of the treaty clearly reveals that the imperialist Governor General gave a complete control to the British in all the matters of the State, internal as well as external through their Resident. The underhand measures employed by the Governor General in bringing the leading chiefs of the Durbar to accept the terms of the Treaty proposed by him and the removal of Rani Jindan from the scene cannot be justified by any code of international law. J.C. Marshmann has correctly observed about the Treaty of Bhyrowal, “an officer of the Company’s artillery became in effect the successor of Ranjit Singh.” The only regret that the Governor General had was that he had not been able to formally annex the plains of the Panjab to an Empire already overgrown. This is clear from his letter to Currie dated 10th December 1846, “Personally I may regret that it is not my fate to plant the British standard on the banks of the Indus.”

WAS MOHAMMAD TUGHLAQ REALLY A FOOL?

There is a common phrase to name anybody doing some foolish act to name him Mohammad Tughlaq. In fact, it is somehow the human psychology to blame someone who is not acting in one’s accord. Now the question arises as to what did Mohammad Tughlaq do to earn such a noble title for himself? In fact, he is blamed for the transfer of capital, introduction of the token currency and raising the revenue in the Gangetic Doab.

First of all, we take the transfer of capital. It is assumed that Mohammad Tughlaq transferred his capital from Delhi to Devgiri, giving it the new name of Daulatabad. Ibn Batuta, a Moorish traveller to his court, puts it as, “The Sultan was infuriated by his subjects of Delhi, who used to write abuses on a piece of paper and managed to throw the same in his palace. They were in fact annoyed by some of his policies, which had made their lives troublesome. The Sultan ultimately came to the conclusion to punish the ‘guilty’ people and he invented such a novel idea for the same.” It is also stated that the entire population of Delhi was ordered to shift to the new capital. While the entire Delhi submitted to the Sultan’s wishes, it was found that two persons dared to challenge the Sultan’s authority. They were brought forth to the Sultan and when enquired, they replied that as one was a lame and another a blind, it was not possible for them to move away from the city. On this, the Sultan ordered to kill the lame and the blind was ordered to move over to the new capital. It is strange to note that only one arm and a leg of his reached there. This theory has been accepted by one and all in India. Even the historians accept this story on the plea that it is narrated by the contemporary writers, e.g Batuta and Zia-ud-Din Barani. This story is taught to the students in India and filled in their minds that Mohd. Tughlaq was really a fool. Even those who don’t know the A,B,C of history authoritatively state that the Tughlaq Sultan was, in fact, a fool.
Secondly, it is stated that he enhanced the revenue in the Doab at a time when famine broke out in the area. Instead of giving some relief to the peasants, he ordered to receive the new rate of revenue from them. The result was that a number of peasants were forced to leave their lands. However, when later on the Sultan announced grants for them, his officials grabbed a huge amount of it thus causing a huge loss to the State exchequer.
Thirdly, it is stated that the Sultan had issued token currency of copper. People in thousands, started preparing this money themselves and when later on the Sultan found that he had not issued so much the amount from his exchequer as was being circulated in the empire, he immediately ordered to cancel his previous orders regarding the token currency and re-issued the old currency.
Now the question arises as to how far was the Sultan responsible for the failure of his policies? If we go through his first plan, I don’t find him a fool. In history, we do depend on the contemporary evidences. I am teaching history for the last 22 years now. I on my part believe that we have to consider the contemporary evidences and there is no history without the evidences. But what if we get only the corrupted evidences? After all logic to any point is also to be considered. In fact, Mohd. Tughlaq was not the only ruler who transferred his capital and returned soon. Harsha Vardhana made Kannauj his capital in place of Thanesar, Iltutmish transferred his capital from Lahore to Delhi, Ala-ud-Din for a short span made Siri his capital, Akbar made Fatehpur Sikri his capital and later on even the British transferred their capital from Calcutta to Delhi. The only difference of change between the two can be said that the other rulers did not force their subjects to move to the new capital. Did Tughlaq really ordered his entire subjects of Delhi to shift to Devgiri? Here I depend more on my common sense than the unwise theory. The Sultan would never had ordered the transfer of his entire population to Delhi. Is it possible for the entire population to settle down immediately to the new environment? Where can they find accommodation? How can they manage their sources of income? It is all worth consideration. Moreover, the Sultan had not adopted any such policy which would have annoyed the common people and they were forced to send abuses to him. For the Sultan, it was not worth his personality to punish the people, though in those days he could award them serious punishments and even the death penalties for even petty crimes.
Regarding the other two problems, the Sultan himself was not as much responsible as the officials and the common masses themselves. The Sultan had issued the token currency taking in view the financial hazards he was facing. The common people thought that it was a novel method to make money for them. The only fault lay here on the part of the Sultan was that he did not keep a vigilant eye on the mints. He was in fact of the view that the common people were also a farsighted as he was; while the fact remains, that he was thinking almost two centuries in advance. Even if we compare the developments in today’s light I doubt if the people worry for the nation. They even today prefer to fulfil their personal motives. Why to blame those who did the same thing almost seven centuries back.
So far the enhancement of revenue, the Sultan was not informed for what was happening at a place situated at a good distance from Delhi. Even his officers preferred to remain mum at any unhappy development, as it would “worry the Sultan”. Those were the times when there was no development in the field of communication. Today thousands of peasants are giving up their lives in the wake of their problems. The government, which happens to be “of ourselves, by ourselves and for ourselves”, is a meek spectator to all these deaths. Daily we are listening to the news, reading them. Do our leaders have something for them? After the death of a person, a leader would come at his funeral, and announce a grant of one lakh or two lakhs of rupees to the next kin of the dead. And more strangely, rarely would they get this amount.
I think Mohammad Tughlaq was not a fool. He was a great idealist, who thought for the best results, but failed due to the lack of common support from his bureaucrats as well as his subjects. However, for his failures, and I repeat for which he was not solely responsible, he has earned a bad name. It is a common saying, give the dog a bad name and kill him. So has been the case with Mohammad Tughlaq.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah : A Communal or a Secular?

There has been a lot of hue and cry over Mr. L.K. Advani giving a certificate of a ‘secularist’ to Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The controversy rises over whether Jinnah was a secularist or a communalist? When we go through the career of Jinnah, he appears a controversial figure. In the earlier part of his political career, he was a nationalist to the true sense; a person who hated the mixture of religion in politics. It was this reason that when the Muslim League was formed in 1906, he peferred to remain aloof of this organisation for the simple reason that its foundation laid on the communal grounds.
Born on 25th December, 1876 A.D. in Karachi, in a Muslim Shiite Khoja family, he was much a Muslim in appearance. He did not dress or speak like a MussalmanHis role in the national movement was commendable. It was he primarily drafted the Lucknow Pact that brought the Congress and the League together on a common platform. He alogwith other nationalist leaders was on the fore-front to demand autonomous status after the war ended.
                                                                                 I
The political scenario in the country had changed after the War. However, there was no change in Jinnah’s ideology. He was the first elected member in the Legislative Council to resign as a protest against the extension of the martial laws after the first world war. He wrote, that “the constitutional rights of the people have been violated at a time when there is no real danger to the State, by an overfretful and incompetent bureaucracy which is neither responsible to the people nor in touch with real public opinion.”1
So far Jinnah’s religious views are concerned, he was indeed a Muslim and remained throughout his life. However, his views were private and had nothing to do with the public life.2 He decided to remain aloof of the Khilafat agitation, which had otherwise attracted the entire Muslim community; the cause which had become an issue of life and death for the Indian Mussalmans.The reason behind Jinnah’s ideology was that he was not in favour of mixing politics with religion as it would prove harmful to the nation. He had time and again stood by the Congress leadership in their voice against the imperialist policies of the alien Indian rulers. In December, 1918, he led more than 300 Congress volunteers in Bombay, and forced the sheriff to call off the meeting proposed to honour Lord Wellingdon on his departure. It was a great victory for the democratic forces as Jinnah addressed the gathering, “Gentlemen! you are the citizens of Bombay. Your triumph today has made it clear that even the combined forces of bureaucracy and autocracy could not overawe. Go and rejoice over the day that has secured us the triumph of democracy.”3
Jinnah, with his nationalist outlook, had opposed the Simon Commission like any other nationalist in the country for the reason that it had no Indian member in it.He held a session of the Muslim League in Calcutta and urged upon the Muslims throughout the country to have nothing to do with the Commission at any stage or in any form.4 The other group of the League, led by Mohammad Shafi, decided to co-operate with the Commission and held the session at Lahore. The Shafi League feared the Hindu domination and felt that the Muslim co-operation with the British only could assure the Muslim security.5 Sir Fazl-i-Hussain, the Unionist leader of the Panjab, had earlier declared to boycott any Parliamentary commission, but later on expressed his willingness to co-operate with it believing that he would get a better hearing from the British government rather than the Indian National Congress or any other political party.6
In the meantime, accepting the challenge of Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, to “produce a constitution which carries behind it a fair measure of general agreement among the great people of India,”7 an All-Parties Conference in Delhi in February 1928. A sub-committee under the chairmanship of Pt. Moti Lal Nehru was formed to draft the proposed constitution for India. However, some of its recommendations became controversial which included the joint electorates with no reservation of seats for any community in the Parliament. Jinnah, on theother hand, was anxious to come to terms with the Congress. After his consultations with other Muslim leaders, he presented his famous Fourteen Points in 1929. These included 33% reservation for the Muslims in Central Legislative Council, separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency, minimum 33% Muslim representation in the formation of any ministry in the country. However, the Congress refused to accept these points incorporating the ‘minimum Muslim demands’.Hence the doors for any future understanding between the League and the Congress were closed.
After the Statutory Commission Report was published, efforts were made to solve the constitutional deadlock. Consequently, the Round Table Conferences were convened in London.However, during the course of these conferences, Mian Fazl-i-Hussain, who was a member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, exercised his influence in the selection of the Muslim delegation. Most of the delegates were his proteges, and those who did not follow him, were removed from the nominees’ list. Similarly, when he found Jinnah not supporting all the communal demands of the Muslims, he was not invited in the remaining two.
The year 1937 is an epoch making event in the modern Indian history. Elections to the Provincial Legislative Assemblies according to the Act of 1935 were held in early 1937. Jinnah prepared the election manifesto, which was quite similar to that of the Congress. “Full responsible government” was his chief object, which was to be realised if the Hindu-Muslim communal differences were removed.8 Such was Jinnah, a nationalist leader, a secular leader till 1937. Now the question arises as to what went wrong with him after the elections that he was forced to change his views and outlook. What were the factors that within three years of the elections he openly announced the two nation theory, and made the formation of a separate State as the goal of the Muslim League. Did the failure in the elections forced him to think otherwise? Did the British rulers influence over him for this goal? Was the short-sightedness of the Congress leadership responsible for Jinnah turning his path from a nationalist leader to a communal and separatist leader? Had he become a puppet in the hands of the communal Muslim leadership? These are certain questions which should be looked into to come to any conclusion.
                                                                                   II
The Muslim League claimed to be representing the Muslims in the entire India. However, the results of the 1937 elections proved otherwise. It fared badly in the Muslim majority provinces as compared to the minority provinces. It failed to annex any seat in Sind and NWFP, while it won mere two seats out of 86 Muslim seats in the Panjab.9 In the Bengal, its tally was 40 out of 119 Muslim seats. On the other hand, its success rate was much better in the minority provinces. It captured 27 out of 64 seats in U.P., 11 out of 28 in Madras, and 20 out of 29 in Bombay. The League in its manifesto had, apart from the general programme, advocated certain communal principles as: to protect religious righgts, to protect and promote Urdu language and the Persian script, as well to devise measures for the amelioration of the general condition of the Muslims.10 Obviously the fears regarding their interests could influence the Muslims in their minority provinces, but found it deterimental to their interests in the majority provinces.11
The defeat of the League in the Muslim constituencies was a challenge to it. Jinnah, its leader, held the lack of unity among the Muslims responsible for its dismal position and urged upon the Muslims all over the country to unite on a single platform.12 Responding to Jinnah’s call, Sikander Hayat Khan, the Premier of the Panjab and the Leader of the Unionist Party, attended the annual session of the League at Lucknow in October 1937 and later on signed a pact with Jinnah, according to which he was to advise all the Muslim members in the Unionist Party to join the Muslim League as well. Accordingly, both the parties were to act in unison during the elections. What was the motive behind both the leaders in signing this pact, but the fact remains, as the future course of history shows, that the League got a strong footing in the Panjab, and Jinnah emerged as a strong leader of the Muslims.”Without the Panjab, the League had no real heartland of power, no core around which to build its potential chain to nationhood. By luring Sir Sikander into his Party’s Camp, Jinnah raised the green flag with its giant ‘P’ ... signalling the birth of an inchoate nation that was to remain the womb of British India for precisely one decade.”13 He urged upon the Muslims all over India to unite into a well-knit and solid organisation because only then could they enforce upon the opposition its wishes.14
The League after its wash-out in 1937 elections, had rallied the Muslims under its banner exploiting their communal hopes and fears. The policy struck at the right point. The results of the bye-elections in different parts of the country had given ample amount of success to the Muslim League candidates. In the 77 bye-elections in the Muslim constituencies between 1937 and 1945, the Muslim League won 55, Independent Muslims 18 and the Congress only 4. Similarly in the Centre, out of 18 bye-elections on the Muslim seats, the League had won 11, Independent Muslims 5 and the Congress 2. Thus the Congress claims to represent the Muslims had been falsified in these elections.
Thus the League, after its failure in the 1937 elections had decided to wear the communal garb and it clicked.
                                                                                       III
The short-sightedness of the Congress leadership was not less responsible in forcing Jinnah to change his path of nationalism. It is believed that both the League and the Congress leadership had reached an understanding of forming coalition government in the U.P. after the elections. But after the results, where the Congress had performed brilliantly, it refused to form any coalition with the League. The Congress-League controversies arising in the United Provinces about formation of ministeries and certain conditions put by the Congress before the League leaders to accept it, created a wedge between the two.15 It had a disastrous impact on the future course of history. Wherever the Congress had formed its Ministeries, allegations were made against its rule by the Muslim leaders for its anti-Muslim policies and for working in the furtherance of the Hindu interests. Fazl-ul-Haq, the Premier of Bengal, the Raja of Pirpur and the Sharif Committee in their reports levelled grave charges against the Congress rule and the Muslim sufferings under it in different parts of the country. It was declared that the Muslim future in India was uncertain under the Hindu domination. To organise them, communal colour was given to the Muslim miseries, poverty and wretchedness and was propangandized that their social, religious, economic and cultural interests were at stake in the Hindu India.16 The future course of history makes it clear that had the Congress leadership, at the time of formation of the Ministeries, taken the League with it, the developments would have been different.
                                                                                        IV
After the beginning of the second World War, the Governor General, Lord Linlithgow, announced Indian support in the war in favour of the allies. The Congress reacted sharply to it. It wanted that the government should have consulted it before making any announcement. As a mark of protest, the Congress high command ordered its Ministeries to resign immediately. After the Congress ministeries resigned, Jinnah announced to celebrate the day as the Day of Deliverance or Yaum-i-Nijat. It was a good opportunity for the British rulers to utilise the Congress- League differences in favour of their war efforts. The Muslim sentiments were aroused, and the British started pinning hopes on the Muslim support as “we have three great Mohammedan powers, Iraq, Egypt and Turkey, in alliance with ourselves.”17 In order to appease the Muslims, the Government declared on 8th August, 1940 that “no constitution should be enacted by His Majesty’s Government and the Parliament without the consent and approval of Muslim India.” Jinnah wanted the government to safeguard the Muslim interests as they had not obstructed its war-efforts.18 The British rulers started giving Jinnah a very prominent position. All the important problems regarding the Muslims were being discussed with Jinnah. Even Winston Churchill, the British Premier, remained in close contact with Jinnah and worked effectively to transform his political policies. The Congress-Government differences gave an opportunity to the League and its leader, Jinnah, to make an effective appearance on the Indian political scenario, thanks to the British policies.
                                                                                        V
Though the Lahore Resolution of 1940 was adopted at the Muslim League session, neither of its leaders was clear of its objectives. Initially, Jinnah accepted that it was a tactical move designed to wring from the Congress more concessions which would make “partnership more tolerable.”19 But soon Jinnah became violent in his approach. “Pakistan has been there for centuries, it is there today and it will remain till the end of the world.” On another occasion he stated, “I am asked, will the British agree to the basic and fundamental principles of the Lahore Resolution, namely to create an independent Muslim State in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India? Whether they agree or whether they do not, we shall fight for it to the last ditch.”20
Whatever might have been the objectives in the minds of Jinnah, the demand of a separate homeland had indeed fascinated the Muslim masses. Once the cry for Pakistan was raised it could not be silenced. To the Muslim masses, it held out an ill-defined and alluring prospect of looting the Hindus and the Sikhs. Ambitious politicians, civil servants as well as some professionals held the opinion that under a Muslim Raj “they would rise to the position of power and affluence un-attainable in a single mixed Hindu-Muslim State.”21 The League was reorganised. The Muslim Women cell of the League was constituted. A committee under the Raja of Mahmoodabad, was appointed to set a plan for the social, economic, political and educational advancement of the Muslims.22 Jinnah had even declared that in the Pakistan demand, the Muslims did not want to dominate the whole of India and had no desire to rule over the Hindus.They wanted their own governments to grow freely and develop their own culture in the two zones which they considered as their homelands.23
There was a great change in the political arena after the war. As the British had won it, they were now no more interested in the League. On the other hand, Jinnah had by this time become a force to reckon with. Efforts of the Congress leaders to appease Jinnah had failed. To solve the Indian deadlock, the Viceroy called a political conference in Simla, on 25th June, 1945, in which the important leaders from all the prominent parties represented. However, it failed as Jinnah was adamant to authorise the Muslim League to select all the Musllim members in the Viceroy’s Council.
In the meantime, the British Government decided to send a Cabinet Mission to have talks with the Indian leaders and find out some suitable alternative to the crisis in the Indian politics. The Mission published its formula on 16th May, 1946 which was a compromise between two different proposals. It recommended for a federal government, thus meeting the demands of a united India as well as League’s demand for a separate Muslim majority area, but denying its scheme of partition on communal lines. However, this scheme failed due to Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru’s statement, which was undoubtedly undiplomatic in the contemporary circumstances. Nehru in a Press Conference in Bombay on 10th July, declared that the Congress was not bound by any British imposed settlement and that his party would change the plan at will by virtue of its majority in the Constituent Assembly.24 It enraged Jinnah, who now decided to achieve the ultimate mission of Muslim homeland, resorting to violent methods through the Direct Action starting from 16th August. “This day we bid good-bye to constitutional methods... We have also forged a pistol and are in a position to use it.”25 In spite of Nehru’s pleadings not to celebrate the day, The League turned a deaf ear to such appeals.
The Direct Action Day witnessed the communal riots throughout the country, which continued for almost a year. The cries of ‘Pakistan Paindabad’ and ‘Larh ke Lenge Pakistan’ were heard everywhere. In the meantime, Jinnah had his talks with Lord Mountbatten, teh new Viceroy of India. He demanded full Panjab and full bengal as parts of Pakistan. “A man is a Punjabi or a Bengali first before he is a Hindu or a Mussalman. If you give us those provinces, you must under no condition, partition them.”26 To this, the Viceroy clarified Jinnah that “a man is not only a Punjabi or a Bengali before he is a Hindu or a Muslim, but he is an Indian before all else.”27 Later on, when the partition became a certain fact, Jinnah declared in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11th August, “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan ... You may belong to any rteligion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of the State. ... We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.” Thus Jinnah, at last, again demonstrated himself as a secular leader.
However, there can be no denying the fact that in real terms Jinnah was not a communal leader, and before 1937 even dared to hate the communal leadership, whether among the Hindus or the Muslims. But the circumstances changed after the elections, much due to the way he was treated by the Congress leaders. The political exigencies of the British rulers during the war days forced them to follow the policy of appeasement towards him and raised his stature to an undaunted Muslim leader. He also came to the conclusion that to achieve his political motives he had to shun the secularism of the Congress leaders and use religion as the rallying point.28 This he did effectively. But after his political ambitions were fulfilled, and when he aimed to make the new State a secular State, even though it was achieved on the religious grounds, he all of a sudden found himself all aloof in the politics which had gained strength in the hands of the Muslim fundamentalists. An arrow had been shot, it could not return to its bow, the new State had been found on communal grounds under the leadership of Jinnah and now there was no one in Pakistan to listen to his cry of secularism. It is all what is history. The economic or political or cultural interests of the masses have hardly been cared of in both the parts of the Greater India. And above all Jinnah will continue to be a controversial figure in history.


References
1. S. Wolpert, “Faithfully Secular” , in India Today, Vol. XXX, No. 25, June 21 - 27, 2005, p. 22.
2. Ibid, 22.
3. Cited in ibid, 22.
4. Cited in Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims, Bombay 1964 (rep.), 188.
5. K.K. Aziz, The Making of Pakistan, London 1967, 41.
6. David Page, Prelude to Partition, Delhi 1982, 181.
7. Cited in V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, New Delhi 1979 (rep.), 34.
8. M. H. Saiyid, The Sound of Fury, New Delhi 1981 (Ind. reprint), 178.
9. Tara Chand, HFMI (Vol. IV), New Delhi 1983 (rep.), 224.
10. N.N. Mitra (ed), Indian Annual Register, 1936 (Vol. I), 301.
11. Humayun Kabir, Musim Politics (1906- 47), Calcutta 1969, 25.
12. See, Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed (ed.), Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah(Vol. I),Lahore1947, 29.
13. S. Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, New Delhi 1985 (Ind. rep.), 151-52.
14. See, S.S. Pirzada (ed.), Foundations of Pakistan (Vol. II), New Delhi 1982 (Ind. rep.), 267.
15. K.B.Sayeed, Pakistan : The Formative Phase, London 1968, 88.
16. M.H. Saiyid, op cit, 180.
17. Wedgewood Benn in the House of Commons, Indian Annual Register, 1939 (Vol. II), 395.
18. S.S. Pirzada (ed.), Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah’s Correspondence, New Delhi 1981 (Ind. ed.), 202.
19. P. Moon, Divide and Quit, London 1961, 37.
20. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed (ed.), op cit, 162.
21. P. Moon, op cit, 22.
22. S. S. Pirzada (ed.), Foundations of Pakistan (Vol. II), 373-74.
23. J.J. Pal, Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan, Delhi 1983, 95.
24. Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, New Delhi 1978 (rep.), 155.
25. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed (ed.), op cit (Vol. II), 314.
26. Jinnah to Mountbatten. Cited in Larry Collins & D. Lappiere Mountbatten and the Partition of India, New Delhi 1982 (Ind. ed.), 43.
27. Mountbatten to Jinnah. Ibid, 43.
28. Mushirul Hasan, “Antithesis of Nehru”, in India Today, op cit, 27.

Judicial System in India

About two-three days back, there was an unprecedented event in the history of judiciary in India. A person being convicted for the last four years threw a bomb at the judge of the Faizabad court. Though the judge was saved and nothing unhappiness occurred, it poses a few questions to a common man. India gained her independence in 1947 A.D., it continued with the judicial system it borrowed from the British. No doubt, throughout the period of the freedom struggle, the system was highly citicised for its high costs and delayed tactics. Even then a few were able to extract the true justice. It is a common saying that justice delayed is justice denied. So why did our national stalwarts never thought of reforming the evils of the corrupted system, and that also for that for which they had been making the common masses aware of.

Second major defect in this system is that many a times justice is granted to a person who had already died many years ago. So what is the fun of such a system which is bent upon destroying many families for no fault of theirs. This reminds me of the subject matter of a movie, where a person was given life imprisonment for the murder of a man, whom he relly murdered 14 years later in the same court-room and in the presence of the same judge.

If we compare our system with that of Pakistan, we find many positive points there. After all, our so called national leaders must work for some betterment for the commen masses in stead of indulging in mutual cheap infightings. Otherwise the day will be near when the harassed lot of the Indians will raise the banner of revolt as had happened in France, Austria, Russia and China etc. There is no lack of such persons who can attack the judges in their seats, representing the corrupt system, but the need is for consciousness. And three or four such events will make the people well aware of what is in fact required.