The appointment of Lord Hardinge as the Governor General of India in 1844, took place at a time when the relations between the Kingdom of Lahore and the British India were passing through a very critical phase. The history of their relations could not but arouse the suspicions of the Khalsa as to the intentions of the British towards the Kingdom of Lahore. For Lord Hardinge had already carried a reputation as a war veteran during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. To the eyes of a far seeing student of history it appeared as if the British Government had appointed him purposely, to direct personally the military operations against the Kingdom of Lahore. That was bound to take place in the near future.
That Hardinge was not a pacifist, is proved from his following letter to Major Broadfoot, written in October 1845: “The Panjab must, however, be Sikh or British, and I see no element out of which a Sikh government can possibly be constructed, the delay is merely a postponement of the settlement of the question.” Writing in the same strain, the Governor General continues, “At the same time we must bear in mind that as yet no cause of war has been given. The lull following the laid breeze will last, I think through the cold season and I anticipate no offensive operation.”
This letter of Hardinge clearly shows that the British were not as they publicly professed; mere passive and disinterested spectators of the anarchic condition in the Punjab. They were making systematic preparations for active intervention in the stormy and unstable political position of the Panjab. And in the preparations, the contribution of Hardinge was of no small measure. Within a year of his assuming the office, Hardinge added 23,000 men and 28 pieces of guns distributed among Ludhiana, Ferozepur, Ambala and Meerut to the existing strength of the British garrison on the Panjab frontier, which was about 17,612 men and 66 guns towards the end of the Governor Generalship of Lord Ellenborough. He further assembled 1100 picked horses and mules at Mathura, and 500 elephants, 700 camels and a large number of bullock carts at convenient stations between Kanpur and Sutlej. In September, a flotilla of 60 large sized boats arrived at Ferozepur to be used for a bridge on the Sutlej in the event of a war.
It is thus clear that under the garb of forbearance and defensive preparation the soldier statesman carried on the policy of his predecessors with greater prescience and skill.
The war that broke out in December 1845, between the British and the Kingdom of Lahore was the deliberate outcome of the British imperialistic policy resulting in the ultimate victory of the British. But it may be pointed out here that the victory was as much the result of the valour of the British arms as the treachery of the Sikh commanders like Lal Singh and Tej Singh etc. and in encouraging them to be traitors to their Kingdom, the hand of Hardinge and his subordinates like Henry Lawrence was no less.
The war having broken out, Hardinge a seasoned soldier that he was, took an active part in directing the operations by moving about from place to place. The victory in this war ultimately sided with the British. The road to Lahore lay open to the victors. Having crossed the Sutlej, the Durbar emissaries hastened to tender their submission to Lord Hardinge.
After the war had been won, the task before Hardinge was much more difficult. It was the task of reconstructing the Kingdom of Lahore in a manner that would make it harmless in future. The farsighted Governor General realized that in the presence of a large number of Sikh soldiers spread all over the State, it would be a difficult affair to extend the boundaries of the British India to Indus by direct annexation of the Kingdom of Lahore without a protracted war of sieges. But the inadequate forces at the disposal of Commander-in-Chief prevented him from engaging in that war of sieges. Therefore, he ruled out the policy of annexation at this stage. The deficit in the Ludhiana treasury, the approaching hot weather and the weakened military resources – all combined to deter Hardinge from annexing the Kingdom of Lahore at that juncture.
But short of a nominal annexation, Lord Hardinge shrewdly gained all the advantages of it by arranging the terms of the Treaty of Lahore.
To turn to the treaty itself, by annexing the Jalandhar Doab and rendering the hills independent of the plains, the victors not only struck a deathblow to its weakened resources but destroyed its political stability as well. The articles relating to the reorganization and limitations of their army made it virtually impossible for the Sikhs to recover their former strength. The English right to control the two rivers and the restrictions on the employment of foreigners reduced the internal independence of the Panjab almost to a mockery. Principal S.R. Kohli has aptly described the treaty made with the Durbar on 9th March as “a blend of confiscatory, retributive and repressive clauses in it; the splitting of Ranjit Singh’s compact empire, a part each for the British, for Gulab Singh and the Durbar was already foreshadowed; and the army reduced to 1/3 of its strength.” Hardinge’s own letter to Henry Lawrence, dated 23rd October, 1846 may be quoted with benefit here to show the working of the mind of the Governor General while arranging the terms of the treaty: “The Panjab was never intended to be an independent State. By the clause I added, the chief of State can neither make war nor peace, nor exchange nor sell n acre of territory, nor admit a European officer nor refuse us a thoroughfare through its territories nor in fact perform any act without our permission. In fact, the native Prince is in fetters and our protection and must do our bidding.”
But the Treaty of Lahore did not mark the elimination of Lord Hardinge’s Panjab’s policy; it was just the beginning. In the months that followed, no efforts were spared to further strengthen the control of the British over the Kingdom of Lahore and remove the obstacles whatever and whenever they come in the way. This is clear from the trial and deposition of Lal Singh and tackling of certain other matters.
The Treaty of Bhyrowal gave the copingstone to Hardinge’s Panjab policy. Careful examination of the terms of the treaty clearly reveals that the imperialist Governor General gave a complete control to the British in all the matters of the State, internal as well as external through their Resident. The underhand measures employed by the Governor General in bringing the leading chiefs of the Durbar to accept the terms of the Treaty proposed by him and the removal of Rani Jindan from the scene cannot be justified by any code of international law. J.C. Marshmann has correctly observed about the Treaty of Bhyrowal, “an officer of the Company’s artillery became in effect the successor of Ranjit Singh.” The only regret that the Governor General had was that he had not been able to formally annex the plains of the Panjab to an Empire already overgrown. This is clear from his letter to Currie dated 10th December 1846, “Personally I may regret that it is not my fate to plant the British standard on the banks of the Indus.”
That Hardinge was not a pacifist, is proved from his following letter to Major Broadfoot, written in October 1845: “The Panjab must, however, be Sikh or British, and I see no element out of which a Sikh government can possibly be constructed, the delay is merely a postponement of the settlement of the question.” Writing in the same strain, the Governor General continues, “At the same time we must bear in mind that as yet no cause of war has been given. The lull following the laid breeze will last, I think through the cold season and I anticipate no offensive operation.”
This letter of Hardinge clearly shows that the British were not as they publicly professed; mere passive and disinterested spectators of the anarchic condition in the Punjab. They were making systematic preparations for active intervention in the stormy and unstable political position of the Panjab. And in the preparations, the contribution of Hardinge was of no small measure. Within a year of his assuming the office, Hardinge added 23,000 men and 28 pieces of guns distributed among Ludhiana, Ferozepur, Ambala and Meerut to the existing strength of the British garrison on the Panjab frontier, which was about 17,612 men and 66 guns towards the end of the Governor Generalship of Lord Ellenborough. He further assembled 1100 picked horses and mules at Mathura, and 500 elephants, 700 camels and a large number of bullock carts at convenient stations between Kanpur and Sutlej. In September, a flotilla of 60 large sized boats arrived at Ferozepur to be used for a bridge on the Sutlej in the event of a war.
It is thus clear that under the garb of forbearance and defensive preparation the soldier statesman carried on the policy of his predecessors with greater prescience and skill.
The war that broke out in December 1845, between the British and the Kingdom of Lahore was the deliberate outcome of the British imperialistic policy resulting in the ultimate victory of the British. But it may be pointed out here that the victory was as much the result of the valour of the British arms as the treachery of the Sikh commanders like Lal Singh and Tej Singh etc. and in encouraging them to be traitors to their Kingdom, the hand of Hardinge and his subordinates like Henry Lawrence was no less.
The war having broken out, Hardinge a seasoned soldier that he was, took an active part in directing the operations by moving about from place to place. The victory in this war ultimately sided with the British. The road to Lahore lay open to the victors. Having crossed the Sutlej, the Durbar emissaries hastened to tender their submission to Lord Hardinge.
After the war had been won, the task before Hardinge was much more difficult. It was the task of reconstructing the Kingdom of Lahore in a manner that would make it harmless in future. The farsighted Governor General realized that in the presence of a large number of Sikh soldiers spread all over the State, it would be a difficult affair to extend the boundaries of the British India to Indus by direct annexation of the Kingdom of Lahore without a protracted war of sieges. But the inadequate forces at the disposal of Commander-in-Chief prevented him from engaging in that war of sieges. Therefore, he ruled out the policy of annexation at this stage. The deficit in the Ludhiana treasury, the approaching hot weather and the weakened military resources – all combined to deter Hardinge from annexing the Kingdom of Lahore at that juncture.
But short of a nominal annexation, Lord Hardinge shrewdly gained all the advantages of it by arranging the terms of the Treaty of Lahore.
To turn to the treaty itself, by annexing the Jalandhar Doab and rendering the hills independent of the plains, the victors not only struck a deathblow to its weakened resources but destroyed its political stability as well. The articles relating to the reorganization and limitations of their army made it virtually impossible for the Sikhs to recover their former strength. The English right to control the two rivers and the restrictions on the employment of foreigners reduced the internal independence of the Panjab almost to a mockery. Principal S.R. Kohli has aptly described the treaty made with the Durbar on 9th March as “a blend of confiscatory, retributive and repressive clauses in it; the splitting of Ranjit Singh’s compact empire, a part each for the British, for Gulab Singh and the Durbar was already foreshadowed; and the army reduced to 1/3 of its strength.” Hardinge’s own letter to Henry Lawrence, dated 23rd October, 1846 may be quoted with benefit here to show the working of the mind of the Governor General while arranging the terms of the treaty: “The Panjab was never intended to be an independent State. By the clause I added, the chief of State can neither make war nor peace, nor exchange nor sell n acre of territory, nor admit a European officer nor refuse us a thoroughfare through its territories nor in fact perform any act without our permission. In fact, the native Prince is in fetters and our protection and must do our bidding.”
But the Treaty of Lahore did not mark the elimination of Lord Hardinge’s Panjab’s policy; it was just the beginning. In the months that followed, no efforts were spared to further strengthen the control of the British over the Kingdom of Lahore and remove the obstacles whatever and whenever they come in the way. This is clear from the trial and deposition of Lal Singh and tackling of certain other matters.
The Treaty of Bhyrowal gave the copingstone to Hardinge’s Panjab policy. Careful examination of the terms of the treaty clearly reveals that the imperialist Governor General gave a complete control to the British in all the matters of the State, internal as well as external through their Resident. The underhand measures employed by the Governor General in bringing the leading chiefs of the Durbar to accept the terms of the Treaty proposed by him and the removal of Rani Jindan from the scene cannot be justified by any code of international law. J.C. Marshmann has correctly observed about the Treaty of Bhyrowal, “an officer of the Company’s artillery became in effect the successor of Ranjit Singh.” The only regret that the Governor General had was that he had not been able to formally annex the plains of the Panjab to an Empire already overgrown. This is clear from his letter to Currie dated 10th December 1846, “Personally I may regret that it is not my fate to plant the British standard on the banks of the Indus.”
